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GAY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN
ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND DRONENBURG v. ZECH
Richard B. Saphire*
In the last several years, constitutional scholars have devoted a
considerable amount of time and energy to the theoretical questions
posed by the practice of judicial review in constitutional cases. The
questions of whether, when, and how much judicial review is legitimate
have been vigorously thrashed out in the academic lit'erature.' Perhaps
not surprisingly, some have begun to question the value of theorizing
about judicial review.' Aside from the contribution such theorizing can
make to the career advancement and academic reputation of constitutional law professors, 3 it might be thought that speculation about the
role of the courts in our political system-and particularly of the
United States Supreme Court-has little real-world significance. And
while the recent presidential election may have heightened public consciousness concerning the long-term significance of potential Reagan
appointees to the Supreme Court,' practicing lawyers-to the extent
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. The author is cocounsel for the
plaintiff in Secora v. Peterson, Civ. Action No. C-3-83-799 (S.D. Ohio), a pending case raising,
inter alia, constitutional claims closely analogous to those asserted in Dronenburg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). I wish to express my appreciation to Joan Mahoney, Frederick
Schauer, Robert Bennett, William Van Alstyne, Laurence Wohi, and Richard Perna for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. The usual disclaimer, of course, is applicable.
I. For a sampling of the literature, see J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law,

132 U. PA. L. REV. 445 (1984); ConstitutionalAdjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 259 (1981); Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207 (1984); JudicialReview and the
Constitution-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 443 (1983); Judicial Review versus
Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to
a Strategy for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984); Posner, The Meaning of
Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1 (1983-1984); Saphire, Constitutional Theory in Perspective: A Response to Professor Van Alstyne, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1435 (1984); Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivismand Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781
(1983); Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special
Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment
and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93 (1983); Van Alstyne, supra note 1.
3. Cf. Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law
Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1979).
4. See Court at the Crossroads,TIME, Oct. 8, 1984, at 28. With respect to the impact of
Reagan appointees on the federal court system in general, see Lauter, A New U.S. Judiciary
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they are aware of the existence of constitutional theory-generally
seem skeptical about its practical application.5
Recently, an important case was decided by the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit).

That case, Dronenburg v. Zech,6 is significant in a number of ways.
First, and perhaps of most immediate importance to those interested in
the constitutional rights of gay persons, the case is significant for its
substantive outcome. The court rejected completely the contention that
the constitutional right to privacy encompasses private, consensual sexual relations between adults of the same sex.' Given the nature of the
8
constitutional issues presented and the stature of the D.C. Circuit, the
Zech decision is certain to have an effect on the way lower federal and
state court judges analyze constitutional claims asserted by gays in the
future. 9 A second measure of the significance of Zech lies in the strikingly explicit way it recognizes and confronts the relevance of constitutional theory. In fact, there may be few contemporary constitutional
cases in which the choice among competing theoretical models has been
so conspicuously presented, and in which the choice between competing
10
models so clearly influenced the outcome of the case.
There is yet a third sense in which Zech is an especially significant
juridical event. In addition to its implications for the development of
gay rights and its explicit confrontation with and resolution of important theoretical questions, Zech raises the question of the appropriate
role of inferior courts 1 in the identification and development of consti-

Looms under Reagan, Nat'l L.J., May 6, 1985, at 1.
5. Imagine the response that a continuing legal education program devoted to constitutional
theory would elicit from the membership of most bar associations. My guess is that the response
would be almost as unenthusiastic as the one most constitutional law professors I know receive
when they try overtly to incorporate theoretical perspectives and literature into their basic constitutional law courses.
6. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
7. Zech is discussed more extensively at infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
8. The D.C. Circuit has long been regarded by many observers as second in importance only
to the Supreme Court in terms of its influence on the development of public law. Moreover, Zech
takes on added significance in light of the fact that two members of the panel deciding the
case-Judges Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia-are frequently mentioned as leading candidates
for appointment to the Supreme Court should vacancies occur during President Reagan's second
term.
9. It should be noted that, while the Zech decision is likely to influence other courts' analyses of the constitutional claims of gays, the direction of that influence is far from certain. Indeed,
in this article I shall argue that both the methodology employed by the Zech court and the court's
resolution of the constitutional claims presented should be rejected by other courts.
10. As will later be noted, the theoretical questions were the primary ones addressed in
Appellant Dronenburg's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc, and provided the basis for the especially candid debate embodied in the separate opinions associated with
the denial of en banc review. See infra notes 178-89 and accompanying text.
II. Since the Supreme Court's role as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution is well
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tutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. In Zech, this issue was extraordinarily important to the way in which the substantive
12
constitutional issues were resolved.
In this essay I shall offer some reflections on each of these
aspects
of the Zech decision. In part I, I shall briefly sketch the jurisprudential
context in which the Zech case was decided. This will include an analysis of the Supreme Court's rather unhelpful attempts to speak to the
precise constitutional questions raised by appellant Dronenburg and the
way the Zech court responded to the Supreme Court's "pronouncements." It will also indicate the ways in which decisions of other federal and state courts contributed to the somewhat ambiguous state of
the jurisprudential landscape from which Zech arose. In part II, I will
turn to the Zech decision itself. After discussing the court's analysis of
Supreme Court precedents, I will suggest an alternative, and I believe,
more convincing analysis of these precedents which easily supports a
doctrinal outcome quite different than that reached by the court in
Zech. I will then argue that even though the Supreme Court has not
clearly and directly confronted the question whether private, consensual
homosexual relations properly can be considered as implicating the
constitutional right to privacy, the principles and values which underlie
the Court's decisions strongly support such an interpretation. In part
III, I will focus on the question of why, given strong support for
Dronenburg's claim in past Supreme Court privacy cases, the court in
Zech so confidently and easily concluded that his claim had so little
merit. In examining this question, I will briefly describe and criticize
both the theoretical model of constitutional law upon which the court
relied and the conception of the function of a lower court embodied in
the court's analysis. Finally, in part IV, I will argue that a careful
analysis of Zech yields important insights concerning the dynamics of
constitutional litigation-insights which, once properly understood, reveal the ways and extent to which an appreciation of and sensitivity to
constitutional theory can have important practical implications for the
real world of constitutional law.

established, see, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), all other courts-both state and federal-are bound by-its constitutional decisions. Where state constitutional issues are presented,
the Supreme Court's resolution of analogous federal constitutional claims is not binding on the
state courts. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See generally Welsh, Whose
Federalism?-The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judgments, 10 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 819 (1983).
12. This issue was joined explicitly in the debate between Judge Bork and Judge Robinson
in their opinions associated with the denial of en banc review. See infra notes 178-95 and accompanying text.
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THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT OF DRONENBURG V.-ZECH

The following are the relevant facts in Dronenburg v. Zech." On
April 21, 1981, James L. Dronenburg was administratively discharged
from the United States Navy. Dronenburg had served in the Navy for
nine years, and at the time of his discharge had achieved the rank of
petty officer. As the D.C. Circuit noted, Dronenburg had "maintained
an unblemished service record and earned many citations praising his
job performance.""' He had served as a linguist and cryptographer and
had received top-security clearance.
Dronenburg's discharge was precipitated by sworn statements
made by a nineteen-year old seaman recruit, which implicated
homosexual acts." 15 Subsequently,
Dronenburg in "repeated
Dronenburg admitted that he was a homosexual and that he had "repeatedly engaged in homosexual conduct in a barracks on the Navy
base." 1 6 The Navy then notified him that it was considering discharging him for misconduct due to homosexual acts that were in violation of
Navy regulations."' Ultimately, the Navy Administrative Discharge
Board voted to recommend that Dronenburg be discharged. The Secretary of the Navy affirmed the discharge and ordered that it be characterized as honorable. Dronenburg then filed suit in federal court claiming that the Navy's policy mandating discharge of homosexuals
violated his constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection of the
laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the Navy. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in a
unanimous decision.
The D.C. Circuit did not decide the case on a clean slate. For the
last ten years or so, federal and state courts at all levels have been
confronted with cases involving the assertion of constitutional claims by

13. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
14. Id. at 1389.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. The regulation Dronenburg was alleged to have violated was SEC/NAV instruction
1900.9C, which provided, in pertinent part, that "[any] ... member [of the Navy] who solicits,
attempts or engages in homosexual acts shall normally be separated from the naval service. The
presence of such a member in a military environment seriously impairs combat readiness, efficiency, security and morale."
SEC/NAV instruction 1900.9C did not invariably make homosexual conduct an automatic
trigger for discharge. Paragraph 6b of the regulation permitted discretionary retention for a member who engaged in only one incident of homosexual conduct when the individual did not "profess
or demonstrate proclivity to repeat such an act." The relevant section of SEC/NAV instruction
1900.9C is reproduced in Zech, 741 F.2d at 1389 n.i. For a brief historical discussion of military
policy concerning homosexual conduct, see Comment, Employment Discrimination in the Armed
Service-An Analysis of Recent Decisions Affecting Sexual Preference Discrimination in the
Military, 27 VILL. L. REv. 351 (1982).
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homosexuals.' 8 All sorts of government policies adversely affecting the
interests of homosexuals have been subjected to constitutional challenge, ranging from laws criminalizing sodomy' 9 to policies discriminating against gays in employment relationships. 20 The results of these
2
cases are not uniform. '
18. For general discussions of the courts' response to cases in which gays have asserted legal
claims of all sorts, see Lasson, Homosexual Rights: The Law in Flux and Conflict, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 47 (1979); Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons
in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 799 (1979); Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy
Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (1977); Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (1974); Note, The Right of Privacy: A Renewed Challenge to Laws Regulating Private Consensual Bahavior, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1067
(1979); Comment, Homosexuals in the Teaching Profession, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 125 (1971).
19. See, e.g., New York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984) (vacating the grant of certiorari to the New York Court of Appeals, which had invalidated a New York statute prohibiting
loitering for purposes of engaging in or soliciting deviate sexual behavior); United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Arkansas sodomy statute
as applied to homosexual act in public places); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex.
1982) (invalidating Texas statute proscribing sexual intercourse between individuals of same sex),
appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), reh'g en banc granted, 743 F.2d 236 (Jan. 25,
1985); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court)
(rejecting constitutional challenge of Virginia's sodomy statute), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976);
People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980) (invalidating New
York sodomy statute on federal constitutional grounds), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). See
generally Comment, The Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 811 (1984).
20. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (invalidating Civil Service
mandatory discharge rule for homosexuals); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d
286, 559 P.2d 1340 (upholding dismissal of homosexual teacher), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879
(1977); cf. Naragon v. Wharton, 737 F.2d 1403, 1406 (5th Cir. 1984) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)
(concluding that employment decision based upon college instructor's homosexual relations with
students presents important but unresolved constitutional issue). For a general discussion of court
decisions pertaining to the constitutionality of predicating civil sanctions on an individual's sexual
orientation, see Rivera, supra note 18, at 805-37, 855-942.
21. The court's opinion in Zech did not refer to a single lower federal court decision implicating the claim of a constitutional right to engage in private, consensual homosexual relations. In
fact, however, a number of courts have dealt with such claims and the results are not uniform.
Prior to Zech, it appears that no court categorically rejected the claim that the right to privacy is
at least implicated by government action similar to that challenged in Zech itself. For example, in
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981), the court
upheld the Navy's discharge of an enlisted woman who had admitted involvement in a homosexual
relationship. While stating that the case did "not require us to address the question whether consensual private homosexual conduct is a fundamental right," id. at 807, the court conceded arguendo that "some kinds of regulation of private consensual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge" and concluded that the Navy's interests in discharging homosexuals "outweigh
whatever heightened solicitude is appropriate for consensual private homosexual conduct." Id. at
810. A similar analysis was applied in Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir.
1984), where the court concluded that the Army's action discharging an enlistee for engaging in
homosexual conduct implicated constitutionally protected interests, but following Belier, held that
the Army's interests outweighed those of the individual. See also Hatheway v. Secretary of the
Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981) (applying Belier analysis to
uphold Army's discharge of officer who had engaged in homosexual acts). In benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980), the court invalidated the Army's discharge of a
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Of particular relevance to the due process-privacy claim asserted
by Dronenburg was the United States Supreme Court's action in Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney.2 2 In Doe, the Court affirmed without
opinion the decision of a three-judge federal district court that had upheld Virginia's sodomy statute. The Court's summary disposition of
Doe created an exceptionally ambiguous situation for subsequent litigation involving privacy and equal protection claims 23 raised by gays.
This ambiguity is attributable, in large part, to the uncertain precedential effect of summary affirmances by the Supreme Court. While it is
well-settled that a summary affirmance conclusively resolves the litigation between the parties,24 summary action does not necessarily embody the Supreme Court's endorsement of the particular rationale employed by the lower court to support its judgment.25 Indeed, Chief
Justice Burger has observed that "upon fuller consideration of an issue
under plenary review, the Court has not hesitated to discard a rule
reservist who had identified herself as a lesbian, basing its decision on both first amendment and
due process grounds. With respect to the due process issue, the court concluded that "constitutional privacy principles clearly protect one's sexual preference in and of themselves [sic] from
government regulations." Id. at 976. See also Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981) (opinions of Judges Boochever and Norris, dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc in Belier).
Finally, in Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court
vacated the district court's decision rejecting constitutional claims of a homosexual discharged
from the Air Force and remanded for determination whether the Air Force abused the discretion
conferred by its regulations to retain homosexuals under certain circumstances. On remand, the
district court concluded that the Air Force could not adequately explain its position on discharge
and retention of homosexuals, either in general or as applied to Matlovich, and it ordered
Matlovich's reinstatement. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1251 (D.D.C. 1980). For a discussion
of the Air Force's subsequent attempts to bring its policies concerning homosexuals in line with
Matlovich, see Comment, supra note 17, at 351, 360 n.58 (1981-1982).
These decisions suggest that even in the military context, where federal courts have been
especially deferential to government decision making, see generally Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims against the Military, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 387 (1984); Haggerty, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Decisions, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 171 (1976), judges have
been unwilling to abdicate completely the responsibility to apply constitutional standards to constrain the military's authority to sanction homosexual conduct. Moreover, these cases lend support
to the view that the issues raised in Zech have not been regarded by other courts as foreclosed by
prior Supreme Court decisions.
22. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
23. Although the district court in Doe did not address the equal protection issues implicated
by the Virginia sodomy statute, the resolution of the privacy claim has obvious implications for
equal protection analysis. To the extent that state action implicates privacy interests, one would
expectsome form of heightened judicial scrutiny applicable in analyzing classifications associated
with that action. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (recognizing that classifications
infringing upon privacy interests would be subject to strict scrutiny but concluding that the Hyde
amendment did not implicate such interests).
24. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975).
25. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676, 1691 n.2 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
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which a line of summary affirmances may appear to have
established." 26
In Zech, the court rejected the argument that, because of the uncertain implications of a prior summary affirmance by the Supreme
Court, the doctrine of stare decisis did not preclude the assertion of
Dronenburg's privacy claims. 7 In doing so, the court also rejected the
argument that the Supreme Court's action in Doe could be explained
on justiciability grounds-namely, that the Court's action was consistent with the view that the plaintiffs lacked standing to attack the constitutionality of the Virginia sodomy statute because they had not been
threatened with prosecution under the statute.28
Significantly, the Zech court did not deal at all with the argument
that, even if Doe could plausibly have been interpreted as a general
approval by the Supreme Court of the substantive constitutional analysis employed by the district court,2 9 subsequent decisions by the Court
have undermined the continued validity of such an interpretation.
Whatever the immediate precedential weight of Supreme Court summary affirmances, the Court has indicated clearly that they are entitled

26.

Fusari, 419 U.S. at 392 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See generally P. BATOR, P.
D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 160-62 (Supp. 1977); Note, The Precedential Effect of Summary Affirmances
and Dismissals for Want of a Substantial Federal Question by the Supreme Court after Hicks v.
Miranda and Mandel v. Bradley, 64 VA. L. REV. 117 (1978).
27. The court concluded simply that "[tihe Supreme Court's summary disposition of a case
constitutes a vote on the merits; as such, it is binding on lower federal courts." Zech, 741 F.2d at
1392. A number of courts have rejected the argument that Doe definitively resolves the question
whether the right to privacy extends to private, consensual, intimate relations between persons of
the same sex. See, e.g., Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 589 (W.D.
Mich. 1983), affd per curiam, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53
U.S.L.W. 3568 (Jan. II, 1985); Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1121, 1137-38; benShalom, 489 F. Supp.
at 964; Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 371-73, 430 A.2d 570, 574 (1981); cf. Naragon, 737 F.2d
at 1406 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Rich, 735 F.2d at 1228 n.8; Miller, 647 F.2d at 84, (Norris, J.,
dissenting); Belier, 632 F.2d at 810 (conceding arguendo that Doe does not preclude conclusion
that some kinds of government regulation of private, consensual homosexual behavior may face
substantial constitutional challenge); Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 476, 415 N.E.2d at 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d
at 947.
28. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1392. This view of Doe has been advanced by some academic commentators. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943 (1978). See alsoPeople v.
Onofre, 72 A.D. 2d 268, 269-70, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (N.Y. Ct. App.), affid, 51 N.Y.2d 476,
415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980) (state appellate court distinguished Doe as a case
where police enforcement of sodomy statute was only speculative), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
29. The district court in Doe had concluded that the "proscription of homosexuality" was
constitutionally unobjectionable because homosexual relations are completely outside the constitutional right of privacy theretofore articulated by the Supreme Court. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
Judge Merhige dissented, interpreting the Supreme Court's privacy cases as "standing for the
principle that every individual has a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern." Id. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
MISHKIN,
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to less weight than decisions in cases preceded by full briefing and oral
argument and in which opinions have been written.3 0 Summary decisions are binding on the lower court until the Court informs them otherwise, 31 or until they are undermined by subsequent doctrinal
32
developments.
With respect to the precedential implications of Doe, it has been
suggested that Doe's preclusive effect on a subsequent court approval of
private, consensual sexual relations among adult homosexuals has been
undermined-or at least called into serious question-by subsequent
doctrinal developments.3 3 The most significant of these developments
has been the Court's statement in Carey v. Population Services International,34 decided less than fifteen months after Doe, that "the Court
has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what
extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults ' 35 Carey, to be sure, did not
involve a claim of a constitutional right to engage in private, consensual
relations between persons of the same sex. 3 But the Court's general
statement concerning the unsettled scope of the right to privacy as it
pertains to private, consensual sexual behavior among adults has been
interpreted as suggesting that Doe was not the Court's final position on
the claims of homosexuals and other single persons to constitutional
protection with respect to sexual conduct. 37 Indeed, one federal court

30.
31.

See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 671.
Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344-45 (citing Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 414 U.S. 1096 (1973)).
32. For a general discussion of the "doctrinal developments" notion's implication for the
proper precedential weight to be accorded Supreme Court summary dispositions, see R. STERN &
E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 330-36 (5th ed. 1978).
33. SeeC. RICE, LEGALIZING HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT: THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 14-15 (1984).
34. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
35. Id. at 694 n.17. The footnote was included in part IV of an opinion written by Justice
Brennan and joined only by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun. However, Justice White
joined in part I of the opinion, which also noted that the question of whether the Constitution
prohibits state regulation of private, consensual sexual behavior among adults had not been "definitively answered." 431 U.S. at 688 n.5. Justice Stevens also joined part I of the Brennan opinion.
Id. at 712.
36. In Carey, the court invalidated New York laws which prohibited the distribution of
nonprescription contraceptives to persons over 16 by anyone other than a licensed pharmacist and
the sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors under 16.
Footnote 17 of the Brennan opinion in Carey did not refer explicitly to any of the Court's
prior cases. Indeed, that part of the footnote cited above, see supra text accompanying note 35,
was followed by a citation to a law review student note. Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for PersonalLiberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670, 719-38 (1973). The cited section of this student
note discussed in a general way privacy cases in the lower courts after Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
37. Indeed, in his separate opinion in Carey, Justice Powell observed that "[t]he Court ap-
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has concluded that, in light of Carey, "'doctrinal developments' have
indicated that little, if any, weight should be given to the summary

affirmance in [Doe]."38

Other developments since Doe can also be interpreted to indicate,
although not unambiguously, that Doe did not foreclose the assertion of
some constitutional protection for private, consensual relations between
adults of the same sex. The most significant of these39 was the Supreme
Court's disposition of New York v. Uplinger.'° In Uplinger, the New
York Court of Appeals had invalidated a New York statute which pro-

parently would subject all state regulation affecting adult sexual relations to the strictest standard
of judicial review." 431 U.S. at 703 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
Moreover, the six justices in Carey who joined in footnotes 5 or 17 could not have been
oblivious to the implications of those footnotes for the precedential status of Doe. In his dissenting
opinion in Carey, Justice Rehnquist stated that he could not "let pass without comment" the
statements in footnotes 5 and 17. Accordingly, citing Doe, he stated that "while we have not ruled
on every conceivable regulation affecting such conduct [private, adult sexual relations] the facial
constitutional validity of criminal statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts has been 'definitively' established." 431 U.S. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1138; see also Briggs, 563 F. Supp. at 586; cf. Doe v. Duling,
603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985) (declining "to speculate and extend the Supreme Court's affirmance in Doe beyond the facts presented therein").
39. The Court, both before and after Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, has denied review
in numerous cases raising, at various levels of generality and directness, constitutional claims asserted by those who have engaged or wished to engage in homosexual activity. A list of many of
these cases can be found in Katz, Sexual Morality and the Constitution: People v. Onofre, 46
ALB. L. REV. 311, 341 n.167 (1982). One of the most significant of these cases was Onofre, 51
N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, discussed in detail in Katz, supra. Onofre's
significance lies in the fact that the New York Court of Appeals, in spite of Doe, held that the
federal constitution prohibited the enforcement of New York's sodomy statute, even as applied to
homosexual conduct.
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Onofre should be
viewed as part of "doctrinal developments" which, as the Court noted in Hicks, 422 U.S. at
344-45, could undermine the precedential effect of summary decisions by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., C. RicE, supra note 33, at 17-18. Indeed the court in Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1139,
concluded that "the lower court decisions in Onofre and Commonwealth's Attorney are inconsistent. . . .And, there is no Supreme Court opinion that determines which approach is constitutionally correct .. "Id at 1139. While the court in Baker recognized that the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in Onofre was "of no precedential value, [and did] not constitute a decision on
the merits of the constitutional questions," id., it clearly regarded the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in Onofre as relevant to its conclusion that Doe did not foreclose privacy claims with
respect to homosexual relations.
It is, of course, well established that denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court has no formal
precedential value. See, e.g., Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (opinion of Justice Frankfurter respecting denial of certiorari); but cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
489 (1953) (observing that "no one knows all that a denial [of certiorari] means"). But given the
striking inconsistency in the constitutional analyses and conclusions of lower courts in Onofre and
Doe, and even taking into account the discretionary nature of certiorari and the heavy pressures
on the Supreme Court's docket, it is difficult to conclude that the Court's treatment of Onofre has
no significance for the current status of Doe.
40. 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984) (per curiam).
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hibited loitering in a public place for the purpose of soliciting or engaging in "deviate" sexual intercourse or other "deviate" behavior. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the statute could not constitutionally
be enforced because the underlying act prohibited-private consensual
sodomy-had been held constitutionally protected in Onofre.4
The United States Supreme Court concluded that its prior grant
of a writ of certiorari to the New York Court of Appeals was improvident and dismissed the writ. While the Court indicated that there was
some confusion in determining the precise constitutional issue decided
by the state court-and indeed noted the possibility that the decision
might have been independently supported by New York law 2 -it noted
that among the grounds offered by the respondents in support of affirmance was that the New York statute violated their equal protection and
due process rights. The Court concluded that the case provided an "inappropriate vehicle for resolving the important constitutional rights of
the parties."143 Since the Court did not differentiate among the "important constitutional rights" that it had not yet resolved, it must be reasonable to assume that the due process-privacy and equal protection
claims were included. Given this assumption, it would appear reasonable to conclude that at least a majority of the justices do not view Doe
as the last word on the subject.4 4
The post-Doe developments are certainly not crystal clear. But Carey suggests that in 1977 at least five current justices 4" did not believe
that Doe had definitively resolved whether the right to privacy extended
to private, consensual homosexual conduct between adults. Uplinger
suggests that a majority of the Court still considers the issue unsettled.4" To be sure, the Court has had numerous occasions since Doe to
confront again-and address in a more clear and definitive man-

41. New York v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 938, 447 N.E.2d. 62, 63, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514,
515 (1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984).
42. Id. at 2333 n.2; id. at 2334 (Stevens, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 2333.
44. If one assumes that the Court is not oblivious to the fact that many lower courts have
concluded that the summary affirmance in Doe either did not purport to adopt the rationale of the
district court, or that subsequent developments have substantially eroded the precedential weight
of Doe, the Court, if it viewed Doe as still viable, could easily have signaled that view in Uplinger.
On the model of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Carey, 431 U.S. at 718 n.2, all the Court had to do
was make an appropriate citation, i.e., but see, to Doe after it referred to "the important constitutional rights" that had yet been resolved.
45. See supra text accompanying note 35. Justice Stewart, who joined Justice Brennan's
opinion in Carey, has of course since been replaced by Justice O'Connor.
46. Uplinger was decided on May 30, 1984, some two and one-half months before Zech.
While counsel for the appellant in Zech brought Uplinger to the panel's attention by letter soon
after Uplinger was decided, Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc at 16
n.31 (on file with University of Dayton Law Review), the case was not referred to at all in the
opinion in Zech.
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ner-the constitutional rights of gays.4 7 Its failure to do so, however,
can just as reasonably be understood as an indication of its ambivalence concerning, and not its commitment to, Doe. In light of this record, the Zech court's relatively curt and unequivocal conclusion that
Doe disposed of appellant Dronenburg's constitutional claims seems, to
48
put it generously, questionable.

47. See authorities cited in supra note 39.
On March 26, 1985, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision in National
Gay Task Force v. Board of Education, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aJfd by an equally
divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985). In that case, the court of appeals rejected a first amendment challenge to an Oklahoma statute prohibiting public school teachers from engaging in "public homosexual conduct," defined by the statute as including "advocating, soliciting, imposing,
encouraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity." Id. at 1272. As construed by the
court of appeals, the statute applied only to prohibit teachers from engaging in public homosexual
activity. Thus, the court concluded that "whatever [the right to privacy's] scope in regard to
homosexual acts," the right was not implicated in the case. Id. at 1273.
On February 25, 1985, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rowland v. Mad River Local
School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985). In Rowland, a
public school counselor was suspended from her employment after she had confided in a coworker
that she was bisexual and that she was involved in an intimate relationship with another woman.
Subsequently, the school board refused to renew her contract. She filed suit seeking reinstatement
and damages claiming, inter alia, that termination of her employment for having engaged in a
homosexual relationship and for expressing to coworkers her status as a bisexual violated her
rights to equal protection and freedom speech. After trial before a federal magistrate, the court
entered judgment for Ms. Rowland on both of these claims.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. With respect to the equal
protection issue, the court found (1) that it was "impossible to tell whether the jury found, inter
alia, that plaintiff was suspended and transferred merely for being bisexual or for talking about
it," and (2) that there "was absolutely no evidence to support the finding that Ms. Rowland was
treated differently from other similarly situated employees." Id. at 450. The court stated that Ms.
Rowland's "personal sexual orientation is not a matter of public concern," id. at 451 (this comment was apparently directed to Rowland's argument that Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983) did not foreclose her first amendment claim), and that its conclusion followed from "nothing more than the required analysis of an equal protection claim." Id. at 452. In dissent, Judge
Edwards stated: "I find no language in the Constitution of the United States which excludes
citizens who are bisexual or homosexual from its protection, and particularly of the protection of
the first and fourteenth amendments thereto. The Constitution protects all citizens of the United
States; no language therein excludes the homosexual minority." Id. at 452.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Rowland, 105 S.Ct. 1373. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, wrote an opinion dissenting from the denial of review, in which he noted:
"Whether constitutional rights are infringed in sexual preference cases, and whether some compelling state interest can be advanced to permit their infringement, are important questions that this
Court has never addressed, and which have left the lower courts in some disarray." Id. at 1378
(citations and footnote omitted).
48. The court in Zech did assume arguendo that Doe did not foreclose Dronenburg's constitutional claims and went on to examine the substance of those claims. Id. at 1392. The court's
analysis of these claims will be discussed later in this essay.
Of considerable interest in this regard is Judge Ginsburg's vote to deny rehearing en banc in
Zech. In her separate opinion, she concluded that the original panel was correct in its determination that Doe disposed of Dronenburg's claims unfavorably. Zech, 746 F.2d at 1581-82. (Ginsburg, J., statement from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Ginsburg did not respond to
Dronenburg's arguments that Doe was no longer viable.
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DRONENBURG V. ZECH

In Dronenburg v. Zech, the Court of Appeals rejected
Dronenburg's claim that the right to privacy, as guaranteed by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment as well as other constitutional
provisions, encompasses the right to engage in private,4 9 consensual,
sexual relations with a person of one's own sex. Having decided that
the Constitution protects no such right, the court went on to conclude
that the Navy's action discharging Dronenburg, for both due process
and equal protection 50 purposes, would be subjected only to the ex-

49. Although not discussed, or apparently even noted, by the court of appeals, the facts in
Zech create some ambiguity about whether the right to engage in private relations was squarely
at issue. Dronenburg was charged with having engaged in homosexual relations in a barracks on a
Navy base. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1389 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d
1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Depending upon the nature of the barracks, it is questionable whether an
expectation of privacy accompanied the conduct that Dronenburg was charged with committing.
Cf United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting constitutional challenge to
Arkansas sodomy statute as applied to homosexual conduct in public restroom).
50. The Zech opinion dealt almost exclusively with Dronenburg's due process claim. Early
in its opinion, the court, without much reasoned elaboration, concluded that the equal protection
claim was linked to and determined by the due process claim. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1391. Although it
is true that government action adversely affecting privacy rights generally will be subject to strict
scrutiny for equal protection purposes, see, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding
that classification infringing upon privacy interests would be subject to strict scrutiny but concluding that Hyde amendment did not implicate privacy right); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
388 (1978) (classification adversely affecting right to marry cannot be upheld "unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests"), a determination that constitutionally protected privacy interests are not at stake does not
necessarily condemn equal protection claims asserted against the same government action to the
highly deferential rational basis standard of review. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); cf. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 239 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that
equal protection analysis, even outside of the suspect classification-fundamental interests strands
of review must often be more demanding than contemplated by rational basis inquiry).
Further, courts have subjected classifications which disadvantage "discrete and insular minorities" to strict scrutiny even where no fundamental constitutional right is implicated. United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Classifications that discriminate
against homosexuals arguably share many of the characteristics that have triggered strict scrutiny
against classifications based on race, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), alienage,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and gender, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (plurality opinion). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 944-45 n.17. At the very
least, such classifications may be regarded as triggering scrutiny more rigorous than a rational
basis inquiry. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (illegal aliens); Cleburne Living
Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984) (classifications based upon mental illness are quasi-suspect).
In this regard, the Supreme Court's recent action in denying review in Rowland, 105 S. Ct.
1373, is worth noting. In Rowland, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from
the denial of certiorari. In discussing the equal protection analysis appropriate in assessing the
constitutionality of classification disadvantaging homosexuals and bisexuals, Justice Brennan
wrote:
First, homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of this country's population. Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss3/12

1985]

GAY RIGHTS & THE CONSTITUTION

tremely deferential rational basis standard of review. Since the court
concluded that "morality" in and of itself was a permissible goal of
government, and that the Navy's policy of discharging otherwise competent personnel was rationally related to "implementing morality,"5 1 it
upheld the Navy's regulation and its application to Dronenburg. Moreover, without viewing it necessary to decide the question, the Court
suggested that the antihomosexual regulation was rationally related to
52
furthering other legitimate military concerns.
Two major criticisms of Zech will be offered here. The first focuses on the Zech court's analysis of Supreme Court precedent in the
right to privacy area. The second criticism focuses on the Zech court's
conclusion that it could find no guidance from the Supreme Court's
decisions which would lead to the identification of principles or values
that might support Dronenburg's privacy claim. Each of these criticisms bears on the theoretical and practical implications of Zech for at
least the immediate future course of litigation asserting the constitu5
tional right to engage in homosexual relations. a

their rights openly in the political arena. Moreover, homosexuals have historically been the
object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination against
homosexuals is "likely . . .to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than . . .rationality."
• . . State action taken against members of such groups based simply on their status as
members of the group traditionally has been subjected to strict, or at least heightened,
scrutiny by this Court.
Second, discrimination based on sexual preference has been found by many courts to
infringe various fundamental constitutional rights, such as the rights to privacy or freedom
of expression. Infringement of such rights found to be "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution," ...
likewise requires the State to demonstrate some compelling interest to survive strict judicial scrutiny. I have previously noted that a multitude of our
precedents supports the view that public employees maintain, no less than all other citizens,
a fundamental constitutional right to make "private choices involving family life and personal autonomy." Whether constitutional rights are infringed in sexual preference cases,
and whether some compelling state interest can be advanced to permit their infringement,
are important questions that this Court has never addressed, and which have left the lower
courts in some disarray.
Id. at 1377-78 (footnotes and citations omitted). Indeed, some courts have concluded or suggested
that homosexuality is a suspect classifying trait. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F.
Supp. 202, 209 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 384 n.3 (D.R.I. 1980);
but cf. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1144 n.58 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (although not reaching
the issue, expressing the view that homosexuality is not a suspect class under Supreme Court
decisions), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), reh'g en banc granted, 743 F.2d 236
(Jan. 25, 1985). For scholarly arguments for heightened equal protection scrutiny of classifications
based upon homosexuality, see Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 TEX. L. REV. 797, 798 n.6
(1984) (citing scholarly literature to same effect).
51. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1398.
52. Id.
53. Although Zech's most obvious and immediate significance is for gay rights litigation, it
clearly has ramifications that extend beyond the constitutionally protected status of homosexual
relations. Given the rather ambiguous scope of the right to privacy derivable from the Supreme
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The Zech Court's Analysis of Supreme Court Precedents

After discussing many of the Supreme Court's modern privacy decisions, the court in Zech concluded that the cases do not "provide even
'54
an ambiguous warrant for the constitutional right [appellant] seeks."
It then went on to conclude:
In this group of cases, and in those cited in the quoted language from the
Court's opinions, we do not find any principle articulated or even approaching in breadth that which appellant seeks to have us adopt ...
The question then becomes whether there is a more general principle that explains these cases and is capable of extrapolation to new
claims not previously decided by the Supreme Court. .... 55
Although conceding that there may be "ample precedent for the
'
creation of new constitutional rights,"56
the court rejected
Dronenburg's argument that the theoretical foundation and moral principles upon which those cases were based either compel or permit recognition of the right Dronenburg advanced. Dronenburg had apparently argued that morality can never be the basis for legislation. 57 The
court had little difficulty in rejecting that general claim, and in an ostensible exercise in syllogistic reasoning (e.g., there is no general constitutional prohibition against basing laws on moral judgments; the law
being challenged rests on a moral judgment; therefore, there is no constitutional prohibition against the enactment or enforcement of this
law), the court rejected Dronenburg's claim that he had a constitutional right to be free from coercive government action based upon his
58
homosexual status or conduct.

Court's cases, the Zech decision could affect courts' analyses of claims pertaining to certain kinds
of heterosexual activity, especially that which occurs outside the context of the traditional marriage. Compare Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.) (holding right to privacy not implicated by police department policy applied to discipline police officers who engaged in nonmarital,
heterosexual intimate relationship), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 404 (1983) with Briggs v. North
Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (holding right of privacy violated
when police department dismissed officer for engaging in extramarital, heterosexual intimate relationship), aff'd per curiam, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W.
3568 (Jan. 11, 1985).
54. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1397.
55. Id. at 1395-96.
56. Id. at 1396 (quoting from Justice White's dissenting opinion in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)).
57. Id. at 1397.
58. Id. The Zech court may have been setting up something of a "straw man argument"
when it generalized Dronenburg's claim in the way that it did. In a telephone conversation with
me, Stephen Bomse, Dronenburg's lead counsel, denied having made the general claim that laws
can never be based on moral judgments. In any event, it would, of course, be absurd to suggest
that such a claim has any foundation in American jurisprudence. Indeed, it would be difficult to
conceive of any law whose rationale could not be articulated in terms of morality. The real ques-
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In rejecting Dronenburg's claim, Judge Bork's 9 opinion analyzed
a number of Supreme Court precedents.6 0 Griswold v. Connecticut6 l
was characterized as a case where "[t]he right of a husband and wife
to use contraceptives . . . was held to be guaranteed by this general
right [of privacy]. . . . It did not indicate what other activities might
be protected by the new right of privacy and did not provide any guidance for reasoning about future claims laid under that right." ' Eisenstadt v. Baird,63 in which the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives, was viewed as a case in which
the Court's rationale could not be extended to other contexts. In Judge
Bork's words:
In order to apply Eisenstadt to a future case not involving the same personal decision [the-decision whether to bear or beget a child], a court
would have to know whether the challenged governmental regulation was
"unwarranted" and whether the regulation was of a matter "so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Eisenstadt itself does not provide any criteria by which either of
64
those decisions can be made.

Next, Judge Bork turned to Roe v. Wade65 and Carey v. Popula6 6 In Roe, of
tion Services International.
course, the Supreme Court
tion before the court was whether the constitutional principles and values that have been articulated in, and which underlie, the Supreme Court's major privacy (and related) decisions prohibit
the government from making and enforcing a particular moral judgment-that consensual, private, intimate association between persons of the same sex is immoral and should be prohibited
and punished by law. For a prominent argument in support of the proposition that the Supreme
Court's privacy decisions preclude at least some moral judgments, see Perry, Why the Supreme
Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae,
32 STAN. L. REv. 1113 (1980).
59. In this essay, I refer to the Zech opinion interchangeably as that of the D.C. Circuit and
that of its author, Judge Robert Bork. As I will note later, the more personalized reference is, in a
significant sense, invited by Judge Bork's own reference to theoretical and doctrinal positions he
articulated and defended-and as to which he has become recognized as a chief proponent, see,
e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 65 (characterizing Bork as "our exemplary interpretivist")-as a
constitutional scholar. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1396 n.5. Although it is certainly the case that the
decision and opinion of an appellate panel must be understood as a collective enterprise, no one
familiar with Judge Bork's published work in constitutional theory can fail to appreciate the
scholar's influence on the judge's handiwork.
60. The cases discussed in the opinion were: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438; Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
61. 381 U.S. 479.
62. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1392.
63. 405 U.S. 438.
64. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1393-94.
65. 410 U.S. 113.
66. 431 U.S. 678.
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had held that the constitutional right to privacy included a woman's
right of choice with respect to abortion. Judge Bork quoted extensively
from Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe. He emphasized the Court's
rejection of the notion that the right to an abortion was absolute, 67 and
concluded that, "though the Court gave an illustrative list of privacy
rights, it also denied that the right was as broad as the right to do as
one pleases with one's body. Aside from listing prior holdings, the
Court provided no explanatory principle that informs a lower court how
to reason about what is and what is not encompassed by the right of
privacy. '"68 In discussing Carey, where the Court had invalidated on
privacy grounds a New York statute regulating access to contraceptives, Judge Bork briefly noted that the Court did not hold there was an
independent right to contraceptives, but that access to contraceptives
was protected because of its relationship to the core privacy interests in
matters relating to childbearing. 9
Judge Bork's analysis of these cases is interesting in several respects. First, his analysis is characterized by an emphasis on the particular holdings of each case. For example, Griswold was considered as if
it were an isolated precedent examined immediately after it was decided. The right to privacy it announced was identified as limited to its
facts and holding. From this perspective, that right could only be understood in terms of the marital relationship; and the approach taken
by Judge Bork was that of a judge trying to determine if and how the
right might be elaborated in the future. Thus, we.are told that Griswold "did not indicate what other activities might be protected by the
new right of privacy and did not provide any guidance for reasoning
about future claims laid under that right.""0 Similarly, Eisenstadt was
also viewed in isolation. We are told that the Court concluded only that
certain regulations against the use of contraceptives by married and
single persons were unwarranted intrusions into "matters so fundamentally affecting a person" as the childbearing decision, but that the
Court's analysis was wholly bereft of any reasoning which plausibly
could be applied to other cases. Moreover, Roe and Carey were considered equally unhelpful because Roe was about abortion and Carey was
about contraceptives. Since Dronenburg was not asserting a right to an
67. The language of Roe emphasized by italics in Judge Bork's opinion was as follows:
The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear
to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has unlimited right to do with one's
body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated
in the Court's decisions.
Zech, 741 F.2d at 1395 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54).
68. Id. at 1395.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 1392.
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abortion or access to contraceptive devices, Judge Bork reasoned that
neither of those cases could provide any support for Dronenburg's privacy claim.
A related but more general feature of Judge Bork's analysis of
these cases was his inability to find any principle or theme derivable
from the cases as a group. What was true for Griswold itself-that it
provided no "guidance for reasoning about future" privacy claims, was
true for all the cases when viewed as a whole. None of the cases so
much as hinted at a "mode of analysis that suggests an answer to the
present case, certainly none that favors appellant. 71 According to
Judge Bork:
In this group of cases, and in those cited in the quoted language
from the Court's opinions, we do not find any principle articulated even
approaching in breadth that which appellant seeks to have us adopt. The
Court has listed as illustrative of the right of privacy such matters as
activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and education. It need hardly be said that
none of these covers a right to homosexual conduct. 72
Judge Bork's failure to identify "even an ambiguous"7 3 principle
articulated in or underlying the Supreme Court's privacy decisions
which logically supported Dronenburg's privacy claim is, I believe,
more a manifestation of Judge Bork's ideological preconceptions than a
product of dispassionate analysis. Indeed, despite the fact that the
Court has not yet explicitly identified a right to engage in private, consensual homosexual relations, its past decisions provide strong support
for such a right. Once the values which have given rise to and which
explicate the specific privacy rights the Court has recognized are understood, it would take an exercise in jurisprudential gymnastics to
maintain that such support is lacking. There are numerous ways to articulate and conceptualize these values. In what follows, I shall briefly
sketch one approach which supports Dronenburg's claim.
74
B. An Alternative Analysis of Supreme Court Precedents
In Griswold v. Connecticut,75 the Supreme Court spoke of a "zone

71. Id.
72. See id. at 1393-94.
73. See id. at 1394-96.
74. In this discussion, I shall offer only a brief sketch of the relevant Supreme Court cases.
For other, more comprehensive accounts of the development of the right to privacy, see L. TRIBE,
supra note 28, at 886-990; Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancingthe Individual and Societal Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983); Posner,
The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173; Richards,
Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and
the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 957 (1979).
75. 381 U.S. 479.
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of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. ' 76
The Court concluded that this right protects certain relationships from
intrusive governmental regulation. Although the Court did not attempt
to identify every protected relationship, it held that the "ultimate relation of husband and wife" had protected status." Subsequently, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,78 the Court effectively extended the privacy interest
beyond the marital relationship. In overturning the conviction of an unmarried person under a law banning distribution of contraceptives, the
Court stated:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting the person as the decision whether to
79
bear or beget a child.
In referring to the individual's privacy right in Eisenstadt, the
Court took several important steps in the development of the privacy
concept. First, it disconnected the right to privacy from the marital
relationship that had been at issue in Griswold. While the marital relationship itself had constitutional significance,8 0 it was not a necessary
predicate to constitutional protection. The Court indicated its understanding that marriage is only one of many forms of interpersonal relationships in and through which individuals express and live out certain
basic human emotions and commitments entitled to constitutional
protection.8 1
A second way in which Eisenstadt contributed to the development
of the right to privacy was the Court's recognition that the decision to
bear a child is only one aspect of the right. By concluding that the right
to privacy should be understood as a right to be free from "government
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child,' 82 the Court made clear that the
right was not concerned exclusively with decisions relating to bearing
76. Id. at 485.
77. Id. at 485-86.
78. 405 U.S. 438.
79. Id. at 453.
80. See, e.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374; Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
81. This principle was reiterated and confirmed in Carey, 431 U.S. 678. In Carey, the Court
invalidated provisions of a New York law which, inter alia, prohibited distribution of contraceptives to persons over 16 by anyone other than a licensed pharmacist and prohibited the sale or
distribution of contraceptives to persons under 16.
82. 405 U.S. at 453.
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and raising children. Thus, while procreative and childrearing decisions
implicate privacy values-a proposition the Court has repeatedly recognized 3-they do not exhaust the kinds of decisions which implicate
privacy values. The Court understood, even if Judge Bork in his opinion
in Zech did not, that procreative and childrearing decisions warrant
constitutional protection because of the ways in which they "fundamentally affect a person."4
Eisenstadt reveals yet another insight into the nature of the constitutional concept of privacy. Immediately after the quotation set out
above, 85 the Court dropped a footnote in which it quoted from Stanley
v. Georgia.8 In the quoted passage from Stanley, the Court had re87
ferred to Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States,
where Brandeis had written:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of

83. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Of course, Carey, Roe, and Griswold also recognized the right to privacy in making decisions
about whether one wished his or her sexual relationships to culminate in the birth of children. The
Court has also recognized constitutionally protected interests in making decisions about rearing
one's children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right of father to custody of his
illegitimate children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right of parents to "direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (fourteenth amendment protects, inter alia, the right "to marry, establish a home and
bring up children"). See also Dike v. School Bd., 650 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1981) (right to privacy
includes the right of a woman to breastfeed her child).
84. In Zech, Judge Bork interpreted Eisenstadt as he no doubt would if-as is widely speculated-he is appointed to the Supreme Court in the second term of the Reagan administration.
See Next in Line for the Nine, TIME, Oct. 8, 1984, at 32 (speculating that Judge Bork and Judge
Scalia, who joined in Bork's opinion in Zech and who is thought to share Bork's constitutional
ideology, may be in line for elevation to the Court). Bork concluded that Eisenstadt did not "provide any criteria" by which a lower court could determine which decisions other than "whether to
bear or beget a child" fundamentally affected a person in a way which would trigger constitutional protection. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1393-94. Later, he concluded that Dronenburg's claim to a
right to engage in a private, consensual homosexual relationship with another adult must be rejected because it did not fall neatly into the list of privacy interests the Court has explicitly found
protected-e.g., "such matters as activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education." Id. at 1395. This analysis is clearly simplistic. It
cannot account for the Court's observation in Eisenstadt that these relationships and interests are
not protected in their own right, but because they represent "matters so fundamentally affecting a
person." Nor can it account for the fact that the Court itself has not sought explicitly to limit the
interests embraced in the constitutional concept of privacy. While it is clear that the process of
explicating which other relationships and interests are entitled to protection is a difficult one, it is
also clear that the Court has determined that the process is an evolutionary one which must be
undertaken.
85. See supra text accompanying note 82.
86. 394 U.S. 557, 564.
87. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found
in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man. 88
By citing this passage from Olmstead, the Court in Eisenstadt adumbrated a conception of individual privacy which, although not selfexplicating, contemplates protection for human "emotions and sensations" which cannot logically or coherently be limited to decisions concerning bearing or raising children, or for that matter, heterosexual relations within the structure of the traditional marriage.
Before attempting to clarify the principles underlying Griswold,
Eisenstadt, Roe, and their progeny, it should be noted that, on at least
two other occasions, the Court has either explicitly indicated that the
constitutional values underlying the right to privacy transcend the marriage-procreation-childrearing cluster of interests, or has refused to
characterize the privacy right in such a limited way. In Whalen v.
Roe, 89 the Court rejected *a facial challenge to a New York law pursuant to which records of all persons obtaining prescriptions for certain
dangerous drugs were transmitted and stored in a centralized computer
file. In the course of his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens noted
that the Court's previous privacy cases had "in fact involved at least
two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters [citing Griswold], and another is the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions
[citing Roe]. ' ' 9 Although the facts of the case did not require the
Court to "extend" either aspect of the right beyond those interests it
had previously found protected, the Court's characterization of the
right in general terms belies the insistence by the court in Zech that
the right must be limited to those interests explictly recognized in the
Court's prior decisions. In fact, Justice Stevens in Whalen cited with
approval Professor Kurland's admonition that "[tlhe concept of a constitutional right of privacy still remains largely undefined." 91
A second case which provides at least implicit support for a privacy right that transcends the marriage-procreation-childrearing cluster of interests is Kelly v. Johnson.9" In Kelly, the Court rejected a
policeman's constitutional challenge to a police department regulation

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 n.10.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 599 n.24 (citing Kurland, The Private I., U. CHi. MAG., Autumn, 1976, at 7, 8).
425 U.S. 238 (1976).
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governing the length and style of policemen's hair. In the process of
doing so, however, the Court noted that, while the "liberty" interest
claimed by the policeman was certainly distinguishable from the interests protected in Roe, Eisenstadt, Griswold, and other cases, recognition of protected interests outside the areas of "procreation, marriage,
and family life" was not obviously foreclosed by those cases." In fact,
the Court went on to assume arguendo that "the citizenry at large has
some sort of 'liberty' interest within the Fourteenth Amendment in
matters of personal appearance. '94 Indeed, Justice Powell wrote a brief
concurring opinion expressing the view that the Constitution extended
at least some protection to an individual's interest in his or her personal
appearance.96
From the foregoing analysis of the Supreme Court's privacy cases,
one theme emerges with what I believe to be striking clarity. The conclusion of the D.C. Circuit in Zech that the Supreme Court's privacy
decisions protect only marital and procreative relationships and childrearing decisions constitutes at best a minimalist account of those
cases. The Court has clearly and explicitly concluded that those relationships and decisions are not to be viewed as the only ones entitled to
constitutional protection. Indeed, to discern the rationale or justification for the Court's conclusion that the Constitution protects even these
relationships, it is necessary to determine why they are protected. 96 In
Eisenstadt, the Court provided at least the seeds of a guiding principle:
at the core of the privacy right is the notion that certain decisions and
relations are essential to the individuals "intellectual and emotional
makeup. ' 97 Those decisions that "fundamentally affect the person" 9 8
and necessarily implicate human "emotions and sensations" 99 in deep

93. Id. at 244 (noting that whether citizenry at large has a "liberty" interest in matters of
personal appearance "is a question on which the Court's cases offer little, if any, guidance.")
94. Id.
95. Id. at 249. Also relevant to the discussion in the text is Stanley, 394 U.S. 557, where
the Court invalidated a statute which made criminal the possession of obscene matter within the
privacy of the home. The statue was found inconsistent with the fundamental "right to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted government intrusions into one's privacy."
Id. at 564. As the court noted in Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1141, it "seems ludicrous to attempt to
draw some constitutional distinction ... between [defendant's] right to 'seek sexual gratification
by viewing' such obscene material, and his right to seek sexual gratification with a consenting
adult partner in private." For a -recent case adding further support for a right to privacy broader
than that suggested in Zech, see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
96. As the plurality noted in Moore, 431 U.S. at 501, "unless we close our eyes to the basic
reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of
these precedents to the family choices involved in this case."
97. 405 U.S. at 453.
98. Id.
99. Id. at n.l0.
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and profound ways are entitled to at least some measure of constitutional protection. This, of course, does not necessarily suggest that
every form of human conduct which leads to some form of physical or
psychic gratification, regardless of its consequences to others, is entitled
to constitutional protection. After all, the Court in Roe v. Wade did
state that "it is not clear to us that the claim . . . that one has an
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's
decisions."' 10 0 Nor do these standards drawn from Eisenstadt provide a
set of clearly discernible criteria that somehow can be mechanically
applied to determine which interests and relationships other than those
heretofore explictly recognized by the Court are entitled to protection.
Indeed, the Court's own concept of the privacy right-a concept which
recognizes that human needs and aspirations are not reducible to static
conceptions but are themselves evolutionary-belies the possibility of
any litmus paper test. But despite the contrary view expressed by Judge
Bork in Zech, it is possible to discern guiding values and principles
from the Court's cases which clearly are implicated when the government engages in actions such as those challenged in Zech.
C. An Account of the Principles and Values Underlying the Constitutional Right to Privacy
In a recent and influential article, Professor Kenneth Karst argued
that at the heart of many of the Court's modern human rights decisions, including Griswold and its progeny, lay a nascent "freedom of,
intimate association. '" 0 1 Karst concluded that "[t]he logic of the freedom of intimate association-that is, the implications of the values that
are the substantive components of this associational freedom--cannot
be contained at the status boundaries of formal marriage or legitimacy
of parentage."'0 2 The values to which Karst referred were the values of
"society" (the opportunity to enjoy the society of certain other people); 0 3 the value of "caring and commitment" (embodying the notion
"that to be human is to need to love and be loved"); 0 4 the value of
"intimacy" (embodying the dual notions of secrecy and love of friendship);o 5 and the value of "self-identification" (involving "the formation

100. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
101. Karst, The Freedom of intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 625 (1980).
102. Id. at 652.
103. Id. at 630.
104. Id. at 632 (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 634. According to Karst: "If a marriage, or a family, or another comparable
association is a 'haven in a heartless world,' the emotional shelter it provides is founded on intimacy." Id. at 635 (footnote omitted).
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and shaping of an individual's sense of his [or her] own identity").10 6
Karst concluded that "[ilt is the choice to form and maintain an
intimate association that permits full realization of the associational
values we cherish most. 1 07° The Supreme Court's protection of the procreation decision in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Carey,
can be explained in terms of the principle of freedom of intimate association, Karst argued, because:
One chooses to be a parent, given today's facility of contraception and
abortion, much as one chooses to marry. The decision to have a child,
whether within or outside marriage, strongly implicates the values of intimate association, particularly the values of caring and commitment, intimacy and self-identification. The decision ranks in importance with any
other a person may make in a lifetime; an attempt to imagine state interests that would justify governmental intrusions amounting to a practical
prohibition on procreation and childbearing takes us out of our own experience and into an imaginary world of Malthusian nightmare.
Because the decision to procreate implicates so intensely the values
of intimate association, significant state interference with the choice not
to procreate also requires justification by reference to state interests of
the highest order. 1 8
Whether conceived in terms of a right to privacy or the freedom of
intimate association, the values Karst -identified are surely those which
underlie, cut across, and provide a coherent framework for understanding the Court's decisions discussed earlier. The right to marry is constitutionally protected because it is a relationship in which human beings
choose to enjoy the society of each other, in which they express and live
out a mutual commitment of caring, friendship, and love, and in and
through which they help form and shape their individual sense of identity. Thus, in Loving v. Virginia,0 9 the Court, in finding marriage one
of the "basic civil rights of man," noted that "the freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."1 110 Similarly, in Griswold, the Court referred to marriage as "a coming together for better
or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred."1
It went on to refer to marriage as an association that promotes "a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not

106. Id. at 635 (footnote omitted).
107. Id. at 637.
108. Id. at 640 (footnote omitted).
109. 388 U.S. I (emphasis added).
110. .d. at 12.
II.
381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).
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commercial or social projects." ' And in United States v. Kras,11 3 the
Court noted that it was not just the marital relationship that was of
basic importance to our society, but "the associational interests that
surround the establishment and dissolution of that relationship."' It is
thus clear that, while the Court has certainly recognized the fundamentally important role of marriage in our society, the legal or artifactual
status of that relationship has not been the central issue. Instead, the
marriage relationship has been protected because it is a form of society
through which individuals express and live out a conception of intimacy, loyalty, commitment, and love. There is no reason in either logic
or human nature why these human capacities and aspirations cannot be
developed and expressed in other forms of society than a traditional,
heterosexual marriage. Consequently, there is no convincing rationale
for limiting the right to privacy to the traditional marriage.
Similarly, the right to decide whether or when to have children is
protected by the constitutional right to privacy because that decision
manifests a determination of whether and how we choose to enjoy the
society and company of other persons and whether or not we believe as
persons that the love given and received by children-the reciprocal
caring and commitment which children occasion-is vital to the fulfillment of our life plan and the realization of our individual identities. As
the Court recognized in Eisenstadt, the decision whether to enter into
consensual sexual relations, and whether we choose to have those relations result in the conception or birth of children, is a decision which
belongs to each of us as individuals. " 5 It cannot be a decision limited
to the context of marriage, because the marriage relationship itself is
only one of many forms of society that can serve as a vehicle for our
search for and expression of caring, commitment, intimacy, love, and
physical and emotional self-realization. As Professor Karst so aptly observed, "[formal associational status plainly is neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for the realization of the values of intimate association. . . . The logic of the freedom of intimate association [and of the
right of privacy] . . . cannot be contained at the status boundaries of
formal marriages or legitimacy of parentage."1 1 6
From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to privacy, once articulated, could not easily, in terms of logic or coherence, be confined to
marriage and procreation. As Professor Richards has observed:

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973).
Id. at 444.
405 U.S. at 453.
Karst, supra note 101, at 647, 652.
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The constitutional right to privacy was developed in Griswold and
its progeny because the procreational model of sexuality could no longer
be sustained by sound empirical or conceptual argument. Lacking such
support, the procreational model could no longer be legally enforced on
the grounds of the "public morality," for it failed to satisfy the postulate
of constitutional morality that legally enforceable moral ideas be
grounded on equal concern and respect for autonomy and demonstrated
by facts capable of empirical validation. Accordingly, since anti-contraceptive laws are based on the concept that nonprocreational sex is unnatural, the Griswold court properly invoked the right of privacy to invalidate the Connecticut statute. For similar reasons, laws prohibiting the
use of pornography in the home were invalidated. Subsequently, abortion
laws were also struck down because the traditional objection to them
rested, in large part, on the procreational model and the residuum of
moral condemnation that was not clearly sustained by sound argument.
If the right to privacy extends to sex among unmarried couples or
even to autoeroticism in the home, it is difficult to understand how in a
principled way the Court could decline to consider fully the application
1 17
of this right to private, consensual, deviant sex acts.
As Richards goes on to note, the constitutional concept of privacy
'expresses an underlying moral principle resting on the enhancement of
sexual autonomy, the self-determination of the role of sexuality in one's
life which protects the values foundational to the concept of human
rights, equal concern and respect for autonomy." 11 8 Human sexuality-and the underlying concept of sexual autonomy--"is not a spiritually empty experience that the state may compulsorily legitimize only
in the form of rigid, marital procreational sex, but one of the fundamental experiences through which, as an end in itself, people define the
meaning of their lives." 11 9 Professor Richards' powerful articulation of
the central role of sexuality and sexual autonomy in human experience
would be difficult to improve upon:
[Sexual love] has for humans the independent status of a profound
ecstasy that makes available to a modern person experiences increasingly
inaccessible in public life: self-transcendence, expression of private fantasy, release of inner tensions, and meaningful and acceptable expression
of regressive desires to be again the free child-unafraid to lose control,

117. Richards, supra note 74, at 981.
118. Id. at 1006. Richards concludes that "in the absence of countervailing moral argument, laws which determine how one will have sex and with what consequences are constitutionally invalid. Such considerations explain the unconstitutionality of laws proscribing contraception,
abortion, and the use of pornography in the home. They also explain why antihomosexuality laws
violate a constitutional right." Id. (footnote omitted). For a recent judicial analysis reaching the
same conclusion, see Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 386-400, 430 A.2d 570, 581-88 (1981) (Davidson, J., dissenting).
119. Richards, supra note 74, at 1003.
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playful, vulnerable, spontaneous, sensually loved. While people may
forgo this experience, any coercive prohibition of it amounts to the deprivation of an experience central in human significance ...
Second, sexual love is sometimes a crucial ingredient in forming
lasting personal relationships and thus can facilitate the good that these
relationships afford in human life. Such durable relationships founded on
sexual intimacy are happily denominated a form of knowledge, in Biblical locution, for they afford to people the capacity for a secure disclosure
of self, not only through exposure of sexual vulnerabilities, but also
through the sharing of recesses of the self otherwise remote and inaccessible. Accordingly, choices involving these relationships are among the
most important strategic decisions in one's life plan. The choice of one's
lover, whether in or outside marriage, involves one's entire self-conception. . . . The disclosure of self that love involves, the mutual shaping of
expectations and life style, and the sharing of common aspirations and
hopes-all these, and others, suggest the extraordinary significance of
decisions about matters of love in the design of a human life.
Third, the force of sexual love in human life expresses itself in the
desire to participate with the beloved in the development of and care for
common projects created by the relationship. In so doing they embody
the lasting value of the friendship and perhaps thus satisfy, in some measure, the longing of human self-consciousness for evidence of the immortal and imperishable self.
In summary, one may appeal to the plausible thought that love is
part of what is commonly meant by the meaning of life. Surely, such
love may not necessarily take sexual form; it may for example, take the
form of a diffuse benevolence toward larger or smaller groups of people,
or even devotion to an abstract entity. But, the absence of love in any
form from a human life renders a life plan incoherently empty at its core
and the life of the spirit deformed and miserably twisted. 2 '

120. Id. at 1003-04. Support for the claim of a right to engage in private and consensual
intimate association with another adult, even of the same sex, can also be found in the values
which underlie the first amendment and equal protection components of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments and the Supreme Court decisions interpreting those provisions. The first amendment
has generally been viewed as protecting, among others, the values of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment. See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803-04 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See generally Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982). Intimate association
clearly implicates these values, and it also constitutes a significant method for communicating or
expressing symbolically "something about who [partners] are and to obtain community recognition of their relationship." Karst, supra note 101, at 651 (footnote omitted); id. at 654 ("there is
no reason in logic for excluding [from the first amendment] expression that is at the heart of most
intimate associations); cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (conduct protected as symbolic expression).
Similarly, the concept of equal protection has long embodied the principle that the state
cannot treat certain groups or individuals as morally inferior to others. See generally Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023 (1979). Government policies which approve heterosexual forms of intimate association but sanction homosex-
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The analyses of Professors Karst and Richards provide a plausible
moral framework for understanding the importance of sexual love to
human beings and the extent to which the freedom to choose the partner with whom one wishes to share the deep psychic and physical intimacy and joy and love allows is fundamental, in the language of Eisenstadt, to one's "intellectual and emotional makeup. 1 '2 1 The privacy
rights the Supreme Court has thus far recognized fit unambiguously
within this framework. So too, it would seem, does the right to engage
in consensual homosexual relations.
What then can be made of Judge Bork's unequivocal conclusion in
Zech that the Supreme Court has "provided no explanatory principle
that informs a lower court how to reason about what is and what is not
encompassed by the right of privacy," 122 and his further conclusion
that such a principle could not plausibly be extracted or discerned from
the Court's decision? 23 Perhaps the Zech court believed that the deprivations associated with government policies which prohibit, regulate, or
sanction private, intimate association between consenting adults of the
same sex are qualitatively different from those associated with policies
impinging upon intimate associations between heterosexuals. If the
weakness of such a view has not been demonstrated by the above discussion, consider the following observations, again by Professor
Richards:
The cumulative effect of such laws accordingly is to deprive homosexuals of the experience of a secure self-respect in their competence in
building personal relationships. The degree of emotional sacrifice thus
exacted for no defensible reason seems among the most unjust deprivations that law can compel. Persons are deprived of a realistic basis for
having confidence and security in their most basic emotional propensities. Criminal penalty, employment risks, and social prejudice converge
to render dubious a person's most spontaneous native sentiments-dividing emotions, physical expression and self-image in a cruelly gratuitous way. The deepest damage is spiritual. A person sur-

ual forms inherently embody and communicate the judgment that homosexuals--even though
similarly situated to heterosexuals in all' other relevant terms-are morally inferior to heterosexuals. See Note, supra note 50, at 830-31. See also Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. I (1977).
121. 405 U.S. at 453.
122. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1395. The Court's discussion of the "freedom of intimate association" in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984), suggests that the Court's own
conception of the principles and values underlying the right to privacy is closely related to the
conception sketched in this essay. The Court specified characteristics that were relevant to determining whether a relationship is protected by privacy and related associational rights. Id. at
3250-5 I. It stated that protecting such relationships "reflects the realization that individuals draw
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others." Id. at 3250.
123. See id. at 1395-97.
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rounded by false social conceptions supported by law finds it difficult to
experience self-esteem in his emotional propensities and their natural expression. Without such self-esteem love lacks foundation and physical
desire, wayward and restless, finds no meaningful or enduring object. Instead of being ensured fair access to love, the homosexual's capacity to
express such feelings is driven into a secretive and concealed world of
shallow and often anonymous physical encounters. The achievement of
emotional relationships of any depth or permanence is made a matter of
heroic individual effort when it could, like heterosexual relations, be part
of the warp and woof of ordinary social possibility and opportunity. In
thus forbidding exclusive homosexuals to express sexual love in the only
way they naturally can, the law deprives them of the good in life that
love affords.124

To suppose that the prohibition or suppression of homosexual intimacies would not, just as profoundly as would be the case with heterosexual intimacies, disturb and diminish the individual's (in Eisenstadt's
terms) "intellectual and emotional makeup," or that they would not
"fundamentally affect a person," is to deny the humanity of those who,
for whatever reason, enter into such intimacies. To suppose that only
heterosexual intimacy implicates such basic human values as society,
love and commitment, and self-identification or realization is to blink at
reality.
III.

THE ZECH COURT'S CONCEPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION AND THE ROLE OF AN INFERIOR FEDERAL COURT

Given the existence of clear and coherent organizing principles
that underlie and explain the Supreme Court's privacy decisions-principles which so clearly point in the direction opposite to that
taken by the D.C. Circuit in Zech-what explains the Zech court's
unequivocal conclusion that the right to privacy does not even apply to
private, intimate relationships between persons of the same sex? 12 5 UnRichards, UnnaturalActs and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: A Moral Theory,
L. REV. 1281, 1332 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
125. It is important to recall that the court in Zech concluded that even if Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976), does not
preclude a determination to the contrary, the Supreme Court's cases reveal no principle which
either compels a conclusion that the right to privacy was implicated by Dronenburg's conduct or
which provides plausible support for such a conclusion. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1392
(D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Moreover, a recognition that the right to privacy is implicated by government action such as
that challenged in Zech does not, of course, mean that the government is powerless to regulate in
ways which adversely affect that right. What a recognition of the right minimally entails is that
the government cannot sanction intimate homosexual association just because it morally disapproves of such intimacies. Cf. Perry, supra note 120 (concluding that Roe v. Wade meant at least
that the government could not adversely affect the abortion decision during the first two trimesters
just because it morally disaproves of abortion). Furthermore, a recognition that the right to pri124.

45

FORDHAM
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derlying Judge Bork's analysis are two basic jurisprudential propositions. The first and most general proposition deals with the proper role
and scope of judicial review in constitutional cases. The second deals
with the proper role of an inferior federal court (or, for that matter, a
state court) in constitutional interpretation. It is to these two propositions that this essay will now turn.
A.

Constitutional Theory and Dronenburg v. Zech

Nowhere has the question of the legitimate scope of judicial review
in constitutional cases been more controverted than in the right to privacy area. In fact, Roe v. Wade,126 in which the Supreme Court held
that the right to privacy previously identified in Griswold v. Connecticut 117 included a woman's right to an abortion, has proven to be not
only a controversial decision in its own right,' 2 8 but one of the principal
test cases for almost all contemporary theorizing about judicial
1 29
review.
One reason privacy has been so controversial as a constitutional
doctrine has been its absence from the list of those rights to which the
Constitution explicitly refers. Moreover, even some theorists who concede that the Constitution means at least some things it does not ex-

vacy applies to homosexual intimacy leads to the conclusion that the government cannot prohibit
such conduct solely on the basis of its perception that society in general--or a particular segment
of society, such as armed service personnel-despises or otherwise disapproves of it. See Palmore
v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1984) ("The Constitution cannot control [racial] prejudices but
neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.") Presumably, if the right to privacy applied in
Zech, the Navy would have had to carry the burden of establishing at least that Dronenburg's
discharge was based upon some ground, other than prejudice, which related to his competence to
carry out his employment responsibilities.
126. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
127. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
128. The commentary on Roe has been extensive. For some prominent examples, see Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein,
Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name. The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159;
Heyman & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765
(1973); Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976); Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of
Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. I (1973).
129. See, e.g., P. BoBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 157-67 (1982); J. ELY, supra note 1, at
2, 15, 21; M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 1-2.
One of the principal academic criticisms directed at Dean Ely's theory of judicial review has
been its inability to accommodate a constitutional right to privacy. See, e.g., Gerety, Doing Without Privacy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1981); Glennon, Personal Autonomy in Democracy and Distrust, I CONST. COMMENT 22 (1984); cf Ely, Democracy and the Right to be Different, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 397 (1981). Interestingly, one of the principal criticisms of Professor Bobbitt's book has
been the ease with which it justifies Roe and the right to privacy. See Van Alstyne, The Fate of
Constitutional ipsi Dixit, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 712 (1983) (reviewing P. BoBIrr, supra).
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plicitly say-which is just about everybody 3 0 -argue that the right to
privacy, or at least some currently recognized elements of the right,
cannot be justified by reference to value sources often thought appropriate to the task of constitutional interpretation. For example, Dean
Ely conceded that it was "entirely proper [for the Court] to infer a
general right to privacy, so long as some care is taken in defining the
sort of right the inference will support."' 3' What he found so objectionable about Roe was that the abortion right was "not inferable from
the language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the
specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation's governmental structure." 132
This is not the place to rehearse extensively the entire range of
positions contemporary constitutional theorists have staked out. 33 Suffice it to say that various theories are often placed on a continuum
between two positions often referred to as "originalism" and "nonoriginalism."' 134 Generally (and superficially) stated, "originalism" contemplates that, when interpreting the Constitution, a court confine itself to the constitutional text, read in light of the Framers' understanding of the words they used and supplemented by reference to values
derivable from the constitutional structure. 35 Nonoriginalism allows a
court to consider not only the constitutional text, structure, and Framers' intent, but also extratextual sources of value, such as traditional or
contemporary conceptions of social justice,' 36 evolving notions of moral-

130. See Saphire, supra note 1, at 1444-46.
131. Ely, supra note 128, at 929.
132. Id. at 935-36 (footnote omitted).
133. For recent discussions of some of the major views, see, e.g., Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic
Society, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981); Komesar, supra note 1; Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); Wiseman, The New Supreme Court Commentators: The
Principled,the Political, and the Philosophical, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 315 (1983).
134. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 1; Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason. A
Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985); This distinction has
also been formulated in terms of "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism." See, e.g., Grey, Do We
Have a Written Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. (1975); see also J. ELY, supra note 1, at 1-43;
M. PERRY, supra note 1 at 6-7, a formulation which recently has been subject to significant
criticism. See, e.g., Lupu; Constitutional Theory and the Search for the Workable Premise, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 579, 601-09 (1983).
135. See Brest, supra note 134, at 204 (defining originalism as "the familiar approach to
constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the
intention of its adopters.") (footnote omitted). Cf. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 2 (describing interpretivism as embodying the view that "the work of the political branches is to be invalidated only in
accord with an inference whose starting point, whose underlying premise, is fairly discoverable in
the Constitution.")
136. See, e.g., Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L.
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ity,'5 7 and so on. Theorists often endorse various forms of originalism
or nonoriginalism; 38 their basic difference lies in the ways and the extent to which they believe the constitutional language and the original
intention of the Framers influence the process of interpretation. For
some originalists, any resort to contemporary values or conceptions of
moral philosophy renders judicial review illegitimate. 139
Judge Bork, as a constitutional scholar (prior to his appointment
to the bench, Bork had been a member of the faculty of Yale Law
School) clearly associated himself with those who adopt a narrow,
originalist approach to judicial review.1 4 ° In fact, he was widely acknowledged as one of the most preeminent and forceful advocates of
that approach. Significantly, prior to his appointment to the bench,
Bork roundly criticized the Court's decision in Griswold, the modern
progenitor of the right to privacy.' 4 Thus, it is not surprising that, as a
judge, Bork would be unwilling to read Griswold and its progeny for
any more than the least they are worth.
Indeed, Judge Bork's analysis represents an attempt to justify a
narrow interpretation of Griswold and the Supreme Court's subsequent
privacy decision by challenging their bona fides. Thus, after reviewing
a number of the Court's decisions, he observed:
These cases, and the suggestion that we apply them to protect homosexual conduct in the Navy, pose a particular jurisprudential problem..
When the Supreme Court decides cases under a specific provision or
amendment to the Constitution it explicates the meaning and suggests
the contours of a value already stated in the document or implied by the
Constitution's structure and history .... But when the Court creates new
rights, as some Justices who have engaged in the process state that they
have done. . ., lower courts have none of these materials available and
can look only to what the Supeme Court has stated to be the principle

745 (1983).
137. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 1.
138. See Saphire, supra note I, at 1444-46.
139. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Berger, Lawyering vs. Philosophizing: Facts or Fancies, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 171 (1984). For a recent critique of noninterpretivism, see Van Alstyne, supra note 1.
140. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
I, 1-20 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bork, Neutral Principles]; Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Bork, The Struggle over the
Role of the Court, NAT'L REV., Sept. 17, 1980, at 1137 [hereinafter cited as Bork, Role of the
Court.] For recent discussions of Bork's position, see M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 102-05; Rosen,
Democracy and Demographics: The Inevitability of a Class-Bound Interpretation, 10 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 37, 52-55 (1984).
141. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 140, at 8-9 ("The Court's Griswold opinion...
failed to justify the derivation of any principles used to strike down the Connecticut anticontraceptive statue or to define the scope of the principle."; "The Griswold opinion . . . fails every test of
neutrality."; "Griswold, then, is an unprincipled decision ..
").
REV.
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involved.1" 2
After rejecting the argument that the Court's cases do implicate a
principle "even approaching in breadth that which appellant seeks to
have us adopt," 4 3 Judge Bork quoted as follows from the dissenting
opinion of Justice White in Moore v. City of East Cleveland:
That the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights should not lead it to repeat the process at will. The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitution. Realizing that the present construction of the Due Process
Clause represents a major judicial gloss on its terms, as well as on the
anticipation of the framers, and that much' of the underpinning for the
broad, substantive application of the Clause disappeared in the conflict
between the Executive and the Judiciary in the 1930's and 1940's, the
Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive
content into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down legislation
adopted by a State or city to promote its welfare. Whenever the Judicigovary does so, it unavoidably pre-empts for itself another part of the
44
ernance of the country without express constitutional authority.'
Although Judge Bork agreed that there was "ample precedent for
the creation of new rights," he concluded, based upon the concerns expressed by Justice White in his Moore dissent, 14 5 that the creation of
such rights (e.g., the right to privacy as recognized by the Supreme
Court) "comes nearest to illegitimacy" when judges make "law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the
Constitution." Accordingly, he concluded "if it is in any degree doubtful that the Supreme Court should freely create new constitutional
rights, we think it certain that lower courts should not do so."16 Since
he clearly believed that the Supreme Court should not have recognized
the right to privacy, as articulated in Griswold and developed in its

142. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1395.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1396 (quoting 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)).
145. No other justice joined in Justice White's dissenting opinion in Moore.
146. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1396. Significantly, after the first clause of the sentence just quoted,
Judge Bork, in a footnote, acknowledged that "when in academic life" he had "expressed the view
that no court should create new constitutional rights; that is, rights must be fairly derived by
standard modes of legal interpretation from the text, structure and history of the Constitution."
Id. at 1396 n.5. It seems somewhat ironic that, in support of this view, Judge Bork cited with
approval to J. ELY, supra note 1, at 2. In his book, Dean Ely developed a theory of judicial review
which he applied, inter alia, to justify heightened judicial scrutiny of classifications which disadvantage homosexuals. Ely noted: "It is therefore a combination of the factors of prejudice and
hideability that renders classifications that disadvantage homosexuals suspicious." Id. at 163
(footnote omitted).
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progeny, he believed it was appropriate to refuse to participate in the
development of that right, even if the privacy cases were based upon
principles that could not logically-or at least not easily-be cabined.
Judge Bork's analysis of the legitimate scope of judicial review-both in general terms and as applied in the right to privacy-is
subject to serious challenge on a number of levels.1 7 As noted earlier,
the form of originalism he espouses contemplates that judges confine
their inquiry to an examination of the constitutional text, the Framers'
intent, and the constitutional structure in determining which rights
should be accorded constitutional status. But even defined in these limited terms, questions concerning the possibility of constraining such a
process render doubtful its prospects for yielding results which reasonably can be characterized as "correct" in any objective sense.1 48 Moreover, Bork's conception of judicial review permits the Court very little
room to participate in the development and articulation of constitutional principle.1 49 To be sure, the debate continues unabated in both
political and academic circles concerning whether the Court (and indeed courts in general) should play any such role, and the extent to
which they should do so.15 0 But, to an intermittently greater or lesser
extent, the Court has traditionally played such a role,15' and there is no
reason to believe that it will not continue to do so. 152
This observation leads to an even more basic problem with Judge
Bork's analysis. A rejection of his narrow conception of judicial review
is not warranted simply because of its intrinsic difficulties. The choice
of methodologies appropriate to the issues raised in Zech did not take
place in a vacuum. For, at least with respect to the constitutional right
to privacy, the Supreme Court has already made its choice, and it is
one fundamentally at odds with the one made by the court in Zech.
Perhaps no recent case demonstrates this proposition more dra-

147. For a recent critique of Bork's general approach to constitutional interpretation, and
the application of that approach in Zech, see Dworkin, Reagan's Justice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov.
8, 1984, at 27.
148. See Bennett, supra note 1.
149. For what it is worth, Bork's conception of judicial review is one which is shared by few
contemporary constitutional scholars, a point Bork himself has recognized and bemoaned. See
Bork, Role of the Court, supra note 140, at 1137.
150. See, e.g., Schwartz, Fifteen Years of the Burger Court, NATION, Sept. 29, 1984, at
262., For one of the most recent scholarly contributions to the debate, see Conkle, The Legitimacy
of Judicial Review in Individual Rights Cases: Michael Perry's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REV. 587 (1985).
151. See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 2.
152. For a collection of essays suggesting that the Burger Court has not signaled a general
retreat from the expansive approach to constitutional interpretation often associated with the
Warren Court, see THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. BLASI
ed. 1983).
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matically than the Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland. 5 ' In Moore, the Court invalidated an East Cleveland ordinance that limited residential use to single-families and defined "family" to exclude nonsibling grandchildren. From an originalist perspective, a holding in Ms. Moore's favor would have to have been justified
by explicit reference in the Constitution to the right claimed, necessary
inferences from the constitutional language, the Framers' intent with
respect to the government's power to restrict familial living arrangement, or the constitutional structure. It is certainly arguable that the
right to live in an extended family could not be explained or justified in
55
these terms,' 5 ' and indeed no justice voting with the majority' purported to do so.' 56
But the inability of Ms. Moore to fit her claim within an originalist methodology did not prove dispositive. Having tacitly conceded that
the right claimed could not be "found" in the text, and having further
conceded that the process of interpretation did not end with this realization, it was necessary to decide what extratextual value sources legitimately could be consulted. Justice Powell addressed this question by
first alluding to Justice Harlan's broad characterization of the Court's
function in due process cases.157 Then, with an obligatory reference to
Lochner v. New York,' 5 8 he noted the potential for abuse inherent in
153. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Moore also provides an important modern example of the significance that choice of theoretical frameworks can play in the way courts reason about and decide
constitutional issues.
154. Professor Grano has written that he "would have no quarrel with Moore if a plausible
interpretivist [originalist] argument could be made in defense of it." Grano, supra note 133, at 10
n.41.
155. Justice Powell wrote a plurality opinion in Moore, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. The plurality held that the ordinance violated the right to privacy. Justice
Stevens wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, concluding that the ordinance violated Ms. Moore's due process right to use her property free from unduly intrusive government
regulation.
156. In his dissent in Moore, Justice White noted "that the substantive content of the [Due
Process] Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by preconstitutional history; that content
is nothing more than the accumulated product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 431 U.S. at 543-44 (White, J., dissenting). But he went on to deny that the
process through which the Court had given substantive content to due process-a process which
has not been confined to narrow readings of the constitutional text and history--was illegitimate.
Indeed, even Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Justice Rehniquist, did not criticize the plurality opinion on the grounds that the right to privacy it endorsed could not be traced to the
constitutional text, history, or structure. They rejected Ms. Moore's claim because, like Justice
White, they concluded-that her interest "in permanently sharing a single kitchen and a suite of
continguous rooms with some of her relatives simply does not rise" to an interest "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
157. 431 U.S. at 501-02 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
158. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court invalidated on due process grounds a New
York law prescribing maximum hours of employment in the baking industry. Lochner generally
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the exercise of such a function. 159 This problem could be minimized, in
Justice Powell's view, by asking whether rights not explictly mentioned
in the Constitution can find roots in "the teachings of history [and]
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society."' 6 0 He
went on to conclude that the right to live in the nonnuclear family was
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"'' and was thus a
part of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.
One could debate whether Justice Powell's focus on history, tradition, and the "basic values that underlie our society," or Justice
White's emphasis in his dissent 6 2 on the "concept of ordered liberty"
provides a sounder basis for determining which constitutionally unarticulated rights are entitled to constitutional protection.'6 3 Indeed, Justice Powell and Justice White engaged in just such a debate.'
For
present purposes, however, it suffices to note that both approaches
demonstrate that the Court has not committed itself-at least not in
any universal or consistent way-to a single theoretical model applicable across the full spectrum of constitutional issues. 6 5 In Moore, no

has been regarded as epitomizing the abuse of judicial power.
159. 431 U.S. at 502 ("As the history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for
concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention becomes the predilections of those who
happen at the time to be Members of this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint."
(footnote omitted)).
160. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
161. Id. (footnote omitted).
162. Justice White premised his dissent upon his disagreement with the methodological
framework employed in Justices Powell's plurality opinion. While he conceded that the constitutional text, history, and structure did not exhaust the sources that legitimately could be consulted
in determining constitutional meaning, see supra note 156, he also cautioned against utilizing
methodologies which require or permit the Court to move beyond these sources. Id. at 544 ("the
judiciary, including this Court, is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the
design of the Constitution.") Justice White argued that Justice Powell's focus on American history and tradition "suggests a far too expansive charter for this Court ....
What the deeply
rooted traditions of the country are is arguable; which of them deserve the protection of the Due
Process Clause is even more debatable." Id. Instead, Justice White would have analyzed Ms.
Moore's claim in terms of whether it implicated an interest "implicit in ordered liberty" or one as
to which it could be said "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed." Id.
163. For a recent argument that all such standards are unacceptable in constitutional interpretation, see J. ELY, supra note 1, at 43-72.
164. 431 U.S. at 503 n.12 (plurality opinion); id. at 549-50 (White, J., dissenting). For a
critical evaluation of both the Powell and White analyses in Moore, see Grano, supra note 133, at
25-27. For a somewhat different evaluation, see Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1015-22, 1051-53 (1979).
165. For further evidence of fundamental disagreement within the Court concerning the
appropriate theoretical framework for evaluating individual rights claims, compare San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. i (1973) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to Texas'
system of substantial reliance on locally generated property taxes in funding public education)
with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (sustaining equal protection challenge to Texas statutes
excluding children of illegal aliens from system of free primary and secondary education).
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justice maintained that the success of Ms. Moore's privacy claim depended on her ability to trace that claim to the Constitution's text, history, or structure. Thus, an approach to constitutional interpretation-and particularly to determining the scope of the right to
privacy-that presumed courts were confined to these sources would, at
least as a descriptive matter, be inaccurate. 6
This picture of the real-world of constitutional law was, of course,
fully understood by Judge Bork when he wrote for the court in Zech.
To the extent that the conception of judicial review advanced by the
appellant in Zech contemplated moving beyond an originalist perspective, it is-as Judge Bork recognized " 7-the conception the Supreme
Court itself has embraced. This is a reality which Judge Bork's personal disapproval of the Court's work, and his citation to Justice
White's admonition in Moore concerning the potential abuses of judicial power, could not obliterate. 168 And yet, Judge Bork did not reject
Dronenburg's claim because he found that claim wanting under a nonoriginalist conception of judicial review. Indeed, the opinion in Zech
did not even attempt to examine Dronenburg's claim in nonoriginalist
terms. To understand the reasons for this failure, it is necessary to examine the conception of the role of an inferior federal court upon which
the opinion in Zech was premised.
B. The Zech Court's Conception of the Role of an Inferior Federal
Court
In the course of his analysis in Zech, Judge Bork concluded that,
in its privacy decisions (and, presumably, elsewhere) the Supreme
Court had "decided that it may create new constitutional rights."1 9 He
then observed that "as judges of constitutionally inferior courts, we are
bound absolutely by that determination."' 170 Thus, the first question he
claimed an inferior court must consider is whether the "new constitutional rights" created by the Supreme Court included "a right which,
fairly defined, covers the case before us or whether the Supreme Court
166. Moore, of course, is not the only modern case to illustrate this point. See, e.g., Plyer,
457 U.S. 202; Roe, 410 U.S. 133. For a particularly illuminating discussion of the extent to which
constitutional interpretation has historically departed from an originalist model, see Sandalow,
ConstitutionalInterpretation, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 1033 (1981).
167. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1396-97.
168. In his opinion dissenting from the denial of Dronenburg's suggestion to hear the case
en banc, Judge Robinson wrote that he and Judges Wald, Mikva, and Edwards, who joined his
opinion, were "deeply troubled by the use of the panel's decision to air a revisionist view of constitutional jurisprudence." Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson,
J., dissenting from denial of suggestion to hear case en banc (emphasis added) (hereinafter cited
as Zech II).
169. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1396 n.5.
170. Id.
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has specified a mode of analysis, a methodology, which honestly applied, reaches the case we must now decide. ' 171 Earlier in this essay, I
argued that the court in Zech gave the wrong answer to this question.
But for present purposes, it is important to note that Bork's evaluation
of the relevant Supreme Court cases, and his unwillingness to find in
those cases a principle or methodology which would support appellant
Dronenburg's constitutional claims, was clearly and fundamentally influenced by his perception of a lower court's function in constitutional
cases. Bork articulated this perception as follows:
No doubt there is "ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights," but, as Justice White said [in Moore], the creation of
such rights "comes nearest to illegitimacy" when judges make "law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the
Constitution." If it is in any degree doubtful that the Supreme Court
should freely create new constitutional rights, we think it certain that
17
lower courts should not do so. 2
In assessing the Zech case, it is essential to understand clearly the
separate elements of this analysis. These elements are:
(1) The Supreme Court's privacy decisions are themselves to be
regarded as suspect because they are based upon a constitutional philosophy and methodology which, at the very least, "comes close" to
being "illegitimate" (e.g., a philosophy or methodology which leads to
the creation of "new constitutional rights").
(2) Although the Supreme Court may, as a matter of raw political
power, adopt methodologies or endorse theories of judicial review which
lead to the creation of "new rights," lower (federal) courts are precluded from doing so.
(3) When interpreting Supreme Court decisions which result in
the "creation of new rights," lower (federal) courts must construe those
newly created rights as narrowly as possible.
This conception of a lower court's function is indeed striking and
unconventional. It is based upon a dubious notion of judicial hierarchy
and is characterized by a form of judicial adventurism that nonoriginalists have traditionally eschewed. It implies that a lower court is
bound conscientiously to determine and apply the principles and values
underlying Supreme Court decisions only where the lower court believes that the Supreme Court has acted legitimately-a judgment that
the lower court may make by applying criteria of legitimacy that it
believes appropriate, or by applying criteria advanced by a Supreme
Court justice in a dissenting opinion. Conversely, Judge Bork's analysis
171.

Id.

172. Id. at 1396. (emphasis added).
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leads to the conclusion that where a lower court is "convinced" that the
Supreme Court strayed from the path of legitimacy, that court has the
prerogative-indeed, the duty-to limit the damage the Supreme
Court has wrought upon the legitimate process of lawmaking ordained
by the Constitution (as the lower court understands the Constitution).
In his dissenting opinion from the denial of en banc review in Zech,
Judge Robinson put the point this way:
The panel's extravagant exegisis on the constitutional right of privacy was wholly unnecessary to decide the case before the court. The
ratio decidendi of the panel decision is fairly well stated in the last paragraph of the opinion. Jurists are free to state their personal views in a
variety of forums, but the opinions of this court are not the proper occasions to throw down gauntlets to the Supreme Court.
We find particularly inappropriate the panel's attempt to wipe away
selected Supreme court decisions in the name of judicial restraint. Regardless whether it is the proper role of lower federal courts to "create
new constitutional rights. . ." surely it is not their function to conduct a
general spring cleaning of constitutional law. Judicial restraint begins at
73
home.1
In his opinion in Zech, Judge Bork purported to disclaim the views
he advanced as an academic,174 referring to those views as "completely
irrelevant to the function of a circuit judge.' 1 75 It is, however, difficult
to take this disclaimer seriously. In fact, it is difficult to reconcile
Bork's position with any traditional or conventionally legitimate conception of the judicial function. To be sure, it would be unrealistic and
perhaps even undesirable to expect individuals appointed to the federal
bench to suddenly disavow judicial and constitutional philosophies developed over a professional career. Indeed, the constitutional formula
for judicial selection and confirmation can be understood as embodying
a presidential prerogative to influence the direction of the federal
courts through the power of appointment. But according to Judge
Bork's account of the role of an inferior federal court, a judge is only
bound by Supreme Court precedent-and the principles and values
which underlay that precedent-when the judge personally endorses
the Supreme Court's methodology. When the judge disagrees with the
Court's decisions, methodology, or the principled and logical implications thereof, the judge is free to limit the damage he or she believes
the Court has created.1 7 6 For one ostensibly committed to the rule of
173. Zech II, 746 F.2d at 1580. (Robinson, J., dissenting from denial of suggestion to hear
case en banc).
174. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1396 n.5.
175. Id.
176. Bork's analysis evokes the Supreme Court's recent admonition that "unless we wish
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law and the integrity of the established legal structure, such a view is
177
indeed extraordinary.
Judge Bork's conception of the role of an inferior federal court in
constitutional litigation was further developed in his statement in connection with the D.C. Circuit's denial of en banc review in Zech. 178 In
anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed
by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to
be." Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam).
In a recent discussion of the proper role of stare decisis in the federal courts of appeals, Judge
Richard Posner argues that, in interpreting earlier (and superior) court decisions, a second court
must not only give effect to the holding of the earlier court but must also apply the reasons
employed by the earlier court to reach its decision. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 254 (1985).
To the extent that the reasoning process of courts in constitutional cases includes the methodologies of decision making they employ (i.e. originalism or nonoriginalism), Judge Bork's analysis in
Zech would seem to violate this notion of stare decisis.
177. Indeed, the substance and tenor of Judge Bork's analysis suggests a sort of professional
schizophrenia. The analysis seems appropriate only when viewed as academic criticism of the
Supreme Court, or an opinion Justice Bork might write in dissent, if and when he is appointed to
the Court.
Indeed, Bork's position seems to invite the admonition offered by Professor Van Alstyne who,
in arguing against the same sort of "judicial activism" that Bork says he opposes, concluded that
if one can't perform consistently within the framework of appropriately restrained constitutional
interpretation, one should "find a career in something one believes to be less compromising and
more ennobling." Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 226.
I wish to make it clear that I am not making the general claim that Judge Bork, or any other
member of the original panel in Zech, subscribes to or acts upon a philosophy that an inferior
federal court is generally free to ignore or flaunt constitutional doctrine as articulated by the
Supreme Court. I have made no effort to examine all of Judge Bork's written opinions in constitutional cases and have no reason to believe that, in general, he does not recognize what I take to be
the conventional distinction between a judge bound to apply the doctrine of stare decisis and
precedent and the independent and critical function of a scholar. Further, I note a distinction
between cases where Supreme Court doctrine and reasoning are sufficiently ambiguous to justify
alternative and significantly different interpretations. For example, in Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984),
the D.C. Circuit divided on the question whether sleeping in a public park constituted "speech"
for purposes of first amendment analysis. A bare majority of the Court concluded that sleeping, at
least under certain circumstances, could be sufficiently expressive to constitute "symbolic speech."
See 703 F.2d at 590-91 (opinion of Judge Mikva); id. at 600 (Robinson, J., concurring); id. at
601 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Judge Scalia, in a dissenting
opinion joined by Judges MacKinnon and Bork, concluded that communication which is not spoken or written is not per se entitled to "equivalent" protection. Id. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
While one might point to Supreme Court decisions that have at least suggested or assumed that
some forms of conduct are to be considered "speech" and entitled to protection equivalent to that
accorded verbal or written communication, and whose underlying rationale provide firm support
for such a conclusion, it would not be implausible to deny that the gravitational force of the
reasoning underlying the Court's decisions necessarily forecloses a contrary result. Id. at 624-25.
Dronenburg v. Zech, however, cannot, in my judgment, be understood as a case where, at the
very least, the relevant Supreme Court decisions and reasoning either foreclosed or provided no
support for the asserted constitutional claim. Once the court assumed arguendo that Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney did not foreclose Dronenburg's privacy claim, it was simply disingenuous to
conclude that that claim could not find at least plausible support in the relevant Supreme Court
cases. See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
178. Zech 1i, 746 F.2d at 1582-84 (statement of Bork, J., joined by Scalia, J.).
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describing the analytical process employed by the original panel, Bork
wrote:
We quoted the pivotal language in each case and concluded that no principle had been articulated that enabled us to determine whether appellant's case fell within or without that principle. In these circumstances,
we thought it improper for a court of appeals to create a new constitutional right of the sort appellant sought. That much is certainly straightforward constitutional exegisis. The dissenters [from the denial of en
banc review] appear to be exercised, however, because the conclusion
that we could not discover a unifying principle underlying these cases
seems to them an implicit criticism of the Supreme Court's performance
in this area. So it may be, but, if so, the implied assessment was inevitable. It is difficult to know how to reach the conclusion that no principle is
discernible in decisions without seeming to criticize those decisions. Had
our real purpose been to propose, as the dissent says, that those cases be
eliminated from constitutional law, we would have engaged in a much
more extensive analysis than we undertook. As it was, we said no more
than we thought required by the appellant's argument.' 79
As previously noted, 8 0 it is highly debatable whether the original
panel's opinion quoted the "pivotal language" from the Supreme Court
privacy decisions. 8 ' But, in my judgment it simply challenges credulity
to conclude that those decisions provide "no discernible principle"
which supported Dronenburg's privacy claim.' 8 2 The principle embed-

179. Id. at 1582. Bork went on to state:
Unless the dissent believes that we are obliged to dissemble, enunciating a unifying
principle where we think none exists, then its only criticism must be with the-adequacy of
our analysis rather than our bona fides. That criticism, we may note, would be a good deal
more persuasive if the dissent set forth (as it conspicuously did not) the unifying principle
that we so obviously overlooked.
Id. at 1583.
180. See supra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
181. Indeed, as previously noted, see supra note 46, the court did not even mention the
Supreme Court's action in New York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984).
182. In a recent book, Judge Richard Posner argues that an important quality of "good
judging" is that of "self-discipline"-a quality that "provides a key to the proper role of personal
policy preferences in judging." R. POSNER, supra note 176, at 220-21.
It is, of course, true that, in one sense, Bork's characterization of the holdings and facts of the
Supreme Court cases discussed in his opinion in Zech, see supra notes 54-72 and accompanying
text, was not, in itself, incorrect: the Supreme Court had not, in any of those cases, directly and
unequivocally held that the right to privacy embraced.the specific claim asserted by Dronenburg.
But I believe that the quality of self-discipline referred to by Posner cannot be understood solely in
terms of a lower court judge faithfully stating the Supreme Court's decisions or honestly characterizing the facts of a case sub judice. That quality also extends to an honest attempt to identify
the fundamental principles that underlie the Supreme Court's decisions, whether the judge personally approves or disapproves of those principles or the direction in which they seem to lead. In my
judgment, Judge Bork's analysis in Zech lacks the quality of self-discipline when understood in
this broader sense.
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ded in the Court's cases may prove too broad, unmanageable, or "nonneutral" 183 for some inferior court judges' tastes. But such judges are
bound to apply principles emanating from the Supreme Court's decisions as they find them, not as they wish them to be. 184
Contrast Judge Bork's conception of the role of a lower court
judge, as embodied in Zech, with the following, and in my judgment
more legitimate, conception. According to this alternative conception,
the judge's function is perceived in terms of applying the law that exists in his or her jurisdiction as that law has been established by existing and authoritative institutions and processes. In constitutional
cases, this function requires the judge to consult the Constitution, the
Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the Constitution, and extratexual sources including (but not limited to) materials capturing the attitudes, philosophy, expectations, and understandings of the founding

183. See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 140.
184. Of course, the same criticism applies regardless whether the inferior court judge would
prefer to limit or expand the scope of Supreme Court doctrine. Thus, were the Supreme Court to
explicitly reject the application of the right to privacy. to private, consensual homosexual relations,
a lower court would not be free to "limit the damage" of the Court's action by recognizing such a
right. (Recall, in this context, that the original panel in Zech concluded no privacy right was even
plausibly discernible from the Court's cases even assuming arguendo that Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney did not foreclose recognition of such a right.)
In this regard, Judge Ginsburg's separate opinion concurring in the decision to deny en banc
review in Zech is worth noting. Judge Ginsburg first concluded that the original panel had correctly interpreted Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney as foreclosing a favorable resolution of
Dronenburg's privacy claim. Zech 11, 746 F.2d at 1581 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in denial of
suggestion for rehearing en banc). She then went on to criticize Judge Robinson's opinion dissenting from the denial of en banc review as follows:
The dissenting opinion bends "judicial restraint" out of shape in suggesting that it is
improper for lower federal courts ever to proposes "spring cleaning" in the Supreme Court.
In my view, lower court judges are not obliged to cede to the law reviews exclusive responsibility for indicating a need for, and proposing the direction of, "further enlightenment
from Higher authority."
Id. at 1581 n.l.
In one sense, Judge Ginsburg's observations are not inconsistent with the analysis of Zech
advanced in this essay. There is nothing wrong with a lower court disagreeing (even publicly) with
the Supreme Court's decisions or methodology, nor is there anything objectionable in proposing
that the Court abandon its current position with respect to-a particular issue. Indeed, this is all
Judge Ginsburg did in a case she cited following the quotation set out above. Mosrie v. Barry, 718
F.2d 1151, 1162-63 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (criticizing Supreme Court doctrine but nonetheless applying it.) It is, however, quite another matter where a court both criticizes and refuses to follow or apply the holdings reached or the principles articulated by the
Court in cases where they are clearly implicated. Cf. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532-33
(IIth Cir. 1983) (criticizing the district court for "disregarding" Supreme Court precedent pertaining to school prayer, noting that "[flederal district courts and circuit courts are bound to
adhere to the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court," and stating that "[i]f the Supreme
Court errs, no other court may correct it."), affd in part, 104 S.Ct. 1704 (1984); see also Jaffrey
v. Board of School Commissioners, 459 U.S. 1314 (1983) (memorandum opinion by Justice Powell, as circuit justice, granting stay of injunction pending appeal).
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generation. 18 5 When it is clear that authoritative sources have accorded
constitutional status to individuals' claims against the government even
when the rights claimed have not been explicitly or unambiguously articulated or established by these materials (as will often be the case),'
the judge must probe the constitutional materials to discern the principles and values that seem best to explain and1 8 7support the decisions
which those sources have previously generated.
In determining whether the right to engage in private, consensual
homosexual relations is embraced within the constitutional right to privacy, a judge must first acknowledge that the authoritative legal materials compel the conclusion that-as even Judge Bork conceded in
Zech' 8 -the constitutional text does not contain an exhaustive list of
the rights that individuals enjoy. Thus, in deciding whether the individual's claim should be accepted, the judge must determine whether the
right claimed shares the same fundamental characteristics as other
rights which the Supreme Court has explicitly identified as constitutionally protected. A reflective response to this question would ask why
the Court found the abortion decision protected, why it found the right
to make decisions regarding childrearing protected, and so on. As I
have argued above, the values implicated by each of these relationships
are the same values implicated in private, consensual homosexual relationships.' 89 Thus, a lower court proceeding under the conception of its
role just outlined should have concluded that Dronenburg's claim did in
fact implicate constitutionally protected rights.
IV.

SOME CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON DRONENBURG V. ZECH
AND THE VALUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

In this essay, I have advanced a number of different criticisms of
the D.C. Circuit's decision and opinion in Zech. Before concluding with
some general observations about the broader jurisprudential significance of Zech for constitutional litigation in general and gay rights
litigation in particular, I think it important to offer a few clarifying
observations. First, I do not wish what I have said to be construed as
suggesting that constitutional adjudication or decision making is always-or even usually-a process in which judges or attorneys can

185. For a more extensive discussion of my views on the role of historical and other materials in constitutional interpretation, see Saphire, supra note 136, at 764-804. For a somewhat
different, but generally congruent analysis, see Perry, supra note 134.
186. See generally Grey, supra note 134; cf. R. BERGER, supra note 139.
187. For an account of the judicial process similar to the one described in text, see R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 86-88 (1977).
188. See Zech, 741 F.2d at 1396.
189. See supra note 101-24 and accompanying text.
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confidently determine "correct" answers to difficult or novel issues if
only they study existing legal materials with sufficient depth and reflection. Every attorney, judge, and scholar who has confronted a novel or
controversial legal question knows that certainty is a scarce commodity, 190 and nowhere is this more true than in constitutional law. Indeed,
bold or unusually self-confident attempts to identify specific constitutional rights absent unambiguous Supreme Court precedent directly
"on-point" should be, and generally are, met with a healthy dose of
skepticism. In my view, however, Dronenberg v. Zech represents one of
the few prominent decisions of an inferior federal court where the ultimate conclusion-that the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent
yield no principle which even plausibly supported the claim asserted-is clearly and unequivocally indefensible.
Second, I do not contend that the claim of a constitutional right to
privacy to engage in private, consensual homosexual relations will inevitably be recognized explicitly by the Supreme Court. Even if, as developed previously, 9 1 Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney is construed as
not foreclosing recognition of the right, the fact remains that the Court
has never explicitly incorporated it into the constitutional concept of
privacy. Indeed, there have been occasional statements by some justices
that the right to privacy does not extend so far. 19 2 But whatever the
reason for the Court's failure to recognize and ameliorate the conflict
and ambiguity created by Doe, and whatever the reason for its failure
(reluctance? unwillingness?) thus far to explicitly extend the right to
privacy to homosexual relations, the jurisprudential framework established by its modern privacy decisions points logically to such a result.
What the D.C. Circuit in Zech failed to recognize is that while the
Supreme Court, as a matter of political power, has the prerogative to
alter its course in the development of the right to privacy, lower courts

190. Attempts to characterize the complexities of the judicial process are legion. Some
prominent examples include: B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); R.
DWORKIN, supra note 187; O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING APPEALS (1960); R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION
(1961); Greenwalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That
Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975); Jurisprudence Symposium, II GA. L. REv. 969
(1977). For recent attempts by judges to describe the processes of judicial decision making, see F.
COFFIN. THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 195-249 (1980); P. DEVLIN, THE JUDGE (1979).
191. See supra notes 22-48 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 718 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973) ("for us to say that our Constitution incorporates the proposition that
conduct involving consenting adults only is always beyond state regulation, is a step we are unable
to take") (footnote omitted).
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do not. 193
What, then, is the general significance of Dronenburg v. Zech for
the litigation of privacy and related constitutional claims in the lower
courts? At the most pragmatic level, of course, it constitutes one more
precedent against a plaintiff desiring to challenge the constitutionality
of federal, state, or local antisodomy laws or similar regulations. Despite the decisions of other lower courts that the right to privacy at
least extends to homosexual relations, 194 Zech fails to recognize such a
right."' To the extent that plaintiffs' lawyers evaluate either the likelihood or certainty of success in asserting the privacy claim,1 96 Zech

193. It could be argued that the function of a lower court in constitutional cases should be
perceived primarily in terms of predicting how the Supreme Court, as constituted from time to
time, would decide a particular issue. To be sure, most lower courts would and probably should be
reluctant to decide an issue in a particular way when there is no plausible support for that decision
in the existing legal materials and when they are convinced that the Court would decide that issue
differently. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744-48 (1982) (arguing
that "disciplining rules" and "interpretive communities" necessarilyoperate to limit the choice of
interpretations courts can legitimately make); but see D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 19-20 (1983). If for no other reason, such a perspective would be taken to avoid the
prospects of certain reversal. But the conception of a lower court as merely attempting to predict
how the Supreme Court would decide the case sub judice is unacceptably sterile. In many cases,
especially with respect to "frontier" issues or areas of unusual doctrinal fluidity, the court would
at best find itself in the position of guessing what the Supreme Court would do. Moreover, the
internal coherence of the legal system-its capacity to put individuals on notice of what activity is
permitted or prohibited-would be undermined. While traditional legal realism and more contemporary critical legal perspectives of the legal system may be difficult to ignore, see E. PURCELL,
THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY, SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM

AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE

74-94 (1973) (describing the rise and tenets of legal realism); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. KAIRYS ed. 1982) (collection of essays by critical legal scholars); Critical
Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (collection of essays by, and responding to,
critical legal scholars), more conventional accounts of the legal system suppose that judges are
expected at least to attempt to discern principles extant in authoritative legal materials.
Finally, the notion that lower courts exist only to predict the way appellate courts would
decide the case sub judice entails the further notion that lower courts play no dynamic or creative
role in the evolution and articulation of the law. In constitutional law, such a view would raise
especially serious problems. Among these is such a view's failure to account reasonably for the
fact that the Supreme Court has neither the capacity nor apparently the interest in reviewing
most of the appeals brought to it from lower courts in which constitutional issues have been raised
and decided. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 8 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (counseling caution and restraint in the expenditure of the Court's scarce resources); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 368 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same). Moreover, the Court itself has
often denied or deferred review in cases because of its recognition of the importance of obtaining
the benefits of the lower courts' perspectives on important but controversial issues. See, e.g., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (opinion of Justice Stevens).
194. See supra notes 19-21.
195. To some extent, this effect may be counterbalanced by the opinion of Judge Robinson,
joined by Judges Edwards, Mikva, and Wald, in their dissent from the denial of rehearing en
banc. Dronenberg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
196. As noted earlier, perceptions of the strength of the privacy claim should and probably
will have an effect on the evaluation of potential equal protection challenges. See supra note 23.
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might well have the effect of discouraging constitutional challenges.197
In my judgment, such a reaction to Zech by the civil rights community
would be both unfortunate (although understandable) and overly pessimistic. As I have argued in this essay, Zech does not represent either
an inevitable or even a persuasive evaluation of the legal materials relevant to proper resolution of the privacy issue. 198 While the Supreme
Court's failure to clearly and directly speak to the issue, combined with
what seems to be a more general and growing unresponsiveness by the
Court to claims of individual rights, 9 9 certainly cautions realism on the
matter, most lower courts 2 0 are in no way precluded from reaching
decisions contrary to that reached in Zech.
In my judgment, however, Zech's significance transcends its immediate impact on the future course of gay rights litigation. Indeed, Zech
reveals what I believe are important insights into the process of constitutional litigation often not fully recognized or appreciated by many
constitutional lawyers, law students, and law teachers. One of these insights is that the shape and direction of constitutional doctrine is often
importantly, indeed profoundly, influenced by one's underlying conception of the nature of the Constitution and the legitimate role and scope
of judicial review. Judge Bork's conception of the Constitution is one in
which the text "is a purposive ordering of norms. Textual language embodies one or more purposes, and the text may be understood and useful applied only if its purposes are understood."'0 As thus conceived,
the constitutional text is "simply the linquistic embodiment of the various concrete political-moral judgments constitutionalized by the ratifiers"2 °2 and the drafters. The only legitimate function of a court is to
identify those judgments and determine which rights they incorporate.

197. For an interesting discussion of the concept of "legal certainty" and its influence on the
action of "informed attorneys," see D'Amato, supra note 192.
198. I have made precisely this argument in a case in which I am now involved. Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Notice of Recently Decided Authority, Secora v. Peterson, No. C-3-83-799 (S.D. Ohio). As of the date of this writing, the court has not ruled on the
government's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment which are, in part, based upon the
argument that the right to privacy does not extend to homosexual relations. The court has, however', set the case for trial in Feb., 1986.
199. See, e.g., Stone, O.T. 1983 and the Era of Aggressive Majoritarianism:A Court in
Transition, 19 GA. L. REV. 15 (1984).
200. Zech, of course, is binding on the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.
Similarly, Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981),
and Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1984) (see supra note 21), may
preclude the successful assertion ofithe privacy issue in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, at least
with respect to claims by military personnel. At the time of this writing, no other federal circuit
has, to my knowledge, definitively spoken to the issue. With respect to recent developments in the
state courts, see generally Katz, supra note 39.
201. Perry, supra note 134, at 305 (quoting Monaghan, supra note 133, at 375).
202. Id.
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Given this conception, it is small wonder that Bork cannot (or will not)
conclude that the Constitution protects a person's choice to further his
or her vision of society, caring, commitment, love, and friendship" by
entering into a sexual relationship with another of the same sex. Although it might be tempting to argue that the right to such a choice
was envisioned by those persons responsible for the language of the Bill
of Rights or the fourteenth amendment, the plausibility of such an argument would and should be seriously suspect. And one who is so unalterably committed to Bork's conception of the Constitution would, perhaps understandably, be unwilling to recognize the existence of such a
right notwithstanding the existence of strong, extratextual materials
supporting its recognition. 04
A second insight derivable from a critical analysis of Zech is that
Bork's conception of the Constitution and judicial review is only one of
a number of conceptions which traditionally have competed-and continue to compete-for supremacy in the evolution of American constitutional jurisprudence. As noted earlier, it is a conception which finds
only erratic support in the performance of the Supreme Court, and
which simply cannot explain the Court's own privacy decisions.2 05 And
as I have noted elsewhere, 20 6 it is a position so fraught with conceptual
and methodological problems that its normative appeal as a paradigm
for constitutional interpretation is seriously undermined. Only a conception of constitutional interpretation which captures a much richer
and vibrant relationship between the text, tradition, and the present
2 7
can hope to achieve lasting ascendancy.
Finally, Zech reveals the practical importance of seizing upon
these insights and harnessing them in the real world of constitutional
litigation. My own experience, as both a teacher and practitioner of
constitutional law, suggests that many students and lawyers regard the
theoretical debate over the nature of the Constitution and the role of
the Court as purely abstract and academic. To the extent that what I
have said in this essay has failed to persuade these skeptics of the fallacy of this perception, consider the following observation addressed to
the D.C. Circuit by the attorneys for James Dronenburg in their petition for rehearing en banc in Zech:

203. See supra notes 101-24 and accompanying text.
204. But see M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 68-69 (arguing that Bork's defense of Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reveals a fundamental inconsistency in the application
of Bork's constitutional theory).
205. See supra notes 13-48 and accompanying text.
206. Saphire, supra note 1, Saphire, supra note 136.
207. In my judgment, the most powerful and elegant modern attempt to articulate such a
conception can be found in Perry, supra note 134.
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The need for rehearing in this case is also underscored by the
panel's approach to the constitutional review issue. The nature of judicial
review is not merely an important issue, it is the overriding question of
American constitutional law. The panel's opinion reflects one view of
that issue, generally referred to as an "interpretivist" approach ...
However, it cannot fairly claim to represent either a consensus view or to
be the prevailing mode of constitutional analysis-a point which the
panel's opinion all but concedes in its discussion of the Supreme Court's
"privacy" cases.
Were this merely a matter of intellectual dispute it would be appropriate to leave the issue for debate or resolution in the law reviews. It is,
however, a matter with immediate and far reaching significance to judicial decision-making. This case illustrates that point. The panel's approach to judicial review .quite plainly was determinative of the outcome
of this case. To put the matter another way, how the constitution is to be
interpreted and applied is, ultimately, a judicial, not an academic, func-

tion

....

208

As this statement makes clear, the harnessing of doctrine (understood as the principles and rules derivable from judicial precedents)
constitutes only a partial ingredient in the development of constitutional argumentation. Where existing doctrine cannot plausibly be understood as resolving unequivocally the claims asserted in a constitutional case-a condition describing not only Zech itself but a
significant percentage of modern constitutional litigation--doctrinal arguments, to be either coherent or efficacious, must be placed within a
conceptual framework reflecting the attorney's descriptive assessment
and normative vision of the nature of Constitution and the judicial role.
Until any single conception of these issues can be said to have achieved
final resolution in our political system, 0 9 courts must choose a theoretical model within which they must reason about constitutional claims.
And, as the Zech case so graphically demonstrates, it is this choice
which will fundamentally determine the resolution of individual cases
and the future direction of constitutional law.

208. Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion of Rehearing en, banc at 9-10, Zech, 746 F.2d
1579.
209. In my view, a permanent resolution of the ongoing debate over the nature of the Constitution is both unlikely and undesirable. See, e.g., Saphire, supra note 1; Levinson "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REv. 123, 150; see also Saphire, The Search
for Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What Price Purity?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 373-77
(1981).
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